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SUMMARY 
This paper draws on findings from a broad research project that employed a constructionist 
approach in analysing policy-discourse in the EU. It uses sources produced by the European 
Commission between 1958 and 2015 for this purpose. The research is used as the basis from 
which to analyse how the EU’s conception of social justice has changed over time. The paper 
analyses two periods in detail, namely 1958 – 1979 and 2010 – 2015 to illustrate the nature of 
the change that has taken place.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to provide the groundwork for further study into the reasons 
behind the growing dissatisfaction that European citizens feel towards the EU, and to help to 
reveal the possible ways this problem can be addressed.  It intends to do this by using 
discourse-analysis to gain a better understanding of the relationship between discourse, legal 
measures, and social outcomes, and to provide a benchmark against which the effectiveness 
of legal and policy-measures can be assessed. It attempts to shed light on the institutionally 
embedded ideas and understandings that underpin the law and the legal process, how these 
change over time, and how they influence and shape the nature of the contribution that the 
EU makes to society.  
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ANALYSING CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
ZOE ADAMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper starts from the premise that the European Union was intended to create the sort of 
society that the majority of its citizens consider to be socially just. However, many European 
Citizens are dissatisfied with the EU today and there is an urgent need to determine exactly 
why this is the case.1 This is an essential pre-requisite for addressing some of the most 
pressing issues pervading contemporary political and legal debate: what should the future of 
the EU be, and what practical steps will be required to realise it?  
 
This paper expresses the belief that one preliminary step in addressing these issues is to 
establish the nature of the conception of social justice that the EU holds, and has held, 
throughout its history. This is a pre-requisite for establishing if the EU’s conception of social 
justice is in line with that of its citizens, and is therefore necessary to help European Citizens 
understand the reasons for their dissatisfaction. This paper employs a constructionist 
approach in analysing policy-discourse in order to understand how the EU's conception of 
social justice has changed over time. In all, five different time periods between 1958 and 
2015 can be identified as distinct phases in the evolution of the EU’s policy-discourse.  In 
this paper, for reasons of space, the focus is on the first and last of these periods (1958-1979 
and 2010-15 respectively).  This choice clarifies the nature of the change which has taken 
place over time, characterised by a complete transformation in the way the EU understands 
the project it embodies.  
                                            
1 While objectively measuring citizen dissatisfaction in the EU is a complex process, a widespread growth in 
‘Euroscpeticism’ is well-documented.(Dinan 2014, 2; Hooghe and Marks 2009) In support of the assumption in 
this paper that dissatisfaction is widespread, see: 40 years of public opinion on the EU: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb40years_en.pdf; (Briggs 2015; Treib 2014; Gottfried 2014; 
Bertoncini and Koenig 2014) 
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The paper begins by setting itself in context by providing a background to the topic (Section 
One). It will then give an outline of the methodology employed in the research (Section 
Two). It will then frame the analysis by offering a number of possible understandings of what 
social justice means, following which the conceptual framework will be presented (Section 
Three). The paper will then attempt to illustrate the extent to which the EU’s conception of 
social justice has changed, presenting an analysis of the discourse between 1958 and 1979, 
followed by an analysis of the discourse since 2010 (Section Four). This will be followed by 
a short discussion, after which the specific contributions the paper can make to legal 
scholarship will be identified. It will conclude with some final remarks. (Section Five). 
Additional information on the sources used for the research is provided in Annex 1.   
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SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT  
CONTEXT 
The European Economic Community2 was a product of the fundamental economic, social and 
political changes taking place in the national and international post-war world.3 The EEC can 
be seen as part of the new post-war settlement and the new expectations that European 
societies had of the state in relation to its role in enhancing welfare.4 The Second World War 
called into question both the legitimacy of the nation-state system and its suitability for 
meeting the needs of modern societies.5 The war had given rise to new social and economic 
needs and had revealed the inadequacies of, and growing dis-satisfaction with, the idea of the 
nation-state as the optimum form of social organisation.6  
 
This paper takes the position that the EEC was fashioned with these concerns in mind. Its 
inception can be linked with the new ways in which states were expected to contribute to 
evolving ideas of social justice. However the EEC’s effect on, and its relationship with, the 
traditional state system was never made explicit.7 Given the existence of competing social 
theories, and therefore different theories of welfare, there was no consensus on the nature of 
the problems it was meant to solve or how it was supposed to do so. Assessing the EU’s 
legitimacy, and how ‘successful’ it has been is difficult because different conceptions of 
social justice expect the EU to have achieved, and be achieving, different things. The nature 
of one’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the EU depends upon the conception of social 
                                            
2 Throughout this paper, the term ‘EU’ will be used when speaking of the EEC, EC or the EU in the abstract but 
the nomenclature specific to the era in question when undertaking the time-specific analysis will be used.  
3 (Giubboni, Gormley, and Shaw 2006, 7) 
4 The paper deliberately adopts a broad definition of “society” given that different conceptions of social justice 
understand this term in different ways.  
5 Changes in the global environment, in particular the influence of the Cold War, also played an important part 
here: see section one: ‘historical context’ and (Stone 2014a; Messenger 2014, 36–37) 
6 (Dinan 2014, 348; Giubboni, Gormley, and Shaw 2006, 9) 
7 (Delanty 1998, 3 and 6.1) 
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justice that one holds, making it difficult to understand the reasons for, or address, the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the EU that we see today.8  
 
In this paper, a ‘conception of social justice’ refers to a particular set of beliefs and 
understandings about the nature of reality, about what life should be like and therefore how 
society should be organised. It implies that actors will form views of what welfare requires in 
terms of political organisation, how political institutions should act, what objectives should 
be pursued and what means should be employed to achieve them. It assumes that this is the 
frame through which the ‘legitimacy’ of public power is understood and assessed by citizens, 
and the frame through which policy problems and solutions are conceived by policy-makers.   
 
Most approaches to discourse-analysis recognise that, for its producers and audience, reality 
is constructed through discourse. It is this discourse that determines what forms of action are 
seen to be relevant and rational, and which irrelevant and unthinkable. This means that policy 
discourse significantly shapes the concrete legal measures that actors will try to bring into 
being. An analysis of policy discourse is therefore vital to one’s understanding of why certain 
measures are taken, while others are not, why they are taken in the way that they are taken, 
and what they are intended to achieve. EU policy discourse helps to make explicit some of 
the assumptions that underpin the law and legal process such that an analysis of this discourse 
can be an important preliminary step towards an informed critique of, and attempt to 
improve, the practical contribution that EU law can make to society.  
 
A potentially productive starting point for this project is to look at conceptions of social 
justice at the level of policy discourse to see how, if at all, the EU’s conception of social 
justice has changed over time. Discourse analysis is a particularly appropriate way to explore 
the nature of the shared beliefs and understandings that frame the way that actors in a 
particular setting and context, such as the EU, think and act.9 It is this that will underpin the 
various policy ideas articulated in the discourse.10 It frames not only how policy problems 
                                            
8 Referred to in: (Dinan 2014, 2); (Hooghe and Marks 2009) For 40 years of public opinion on the EU see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb40years_en.pdf  
9 This is what is meant by the conception of social justice of the EU as an institution: see a similar interpretation 
of ‘institutions’ in: (SCHMIDT 2010, 55) 
10 Similar approaches are employed in the political science literature: (Kingdon and Thurber 1984; ‘The Varied 
Role of Ideas in Politics’ 2010) (Mehta 2010)  
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and solutions are conceived, but also actors’ own perceptions of what their interests are. It is 
the frame through which they interpret their overall historical, economic and social context, 
the various legal and policy-making rules to which they are subject, and therefore how they 
believe discourse should be articulated if they are to bring their desired policies into effect.   
 
The articulation of discourse will also be influenced by any link made between the perceived 
legitimacy of a policy and its success. It may be believed that articulating a policy in a 
particular way will have more resonance with its audience’s conception of social justice, and 
therefore be more likely to be perceived to be legitimate. Alternatively, social expectations 
might condition what policies it believes it should be pursuing.11 
 
The legitimacy of the EU can be assessed by citizens only on the basis of what they know: 
the way that the law affects them in their everyday life, the nature and quality of the life they 
lead, and the society in which they live. Understanding the relationship between the EU’s 
‘conception of social justice’, its policy-discourse, legal outcomes and social consequences, is 
therefore important for facilitating a transparent assessment of the EU. Discourse analysis can 
help to reveal underlying conceptions of social justice, such that a benchmark can be 
provided against which to assess the ‘success’ of the EU. It can facilitate a better 
understanding of how policy and the legal framework interact, and therefore how policy 
influences social outcomes.  It can therefore shed light on the relative efficacy of different EU 
legal instruments, and the way EU law operates in practice.   
 
This suggests that this paper will not only make a contribution to EU legal scholarship, but 
will also help to ground contemporary critiques of the EU. It will help to indicate, from the 
perspective of any given individual, both the extent to which the EU has delivered on its 
promises, and whether it was ever, or is now, even promising the ‘right’ things. This can then 
help to provide the basis for informed public debate over how the concerns of European 
citizens can be addressed today, and what practical steps can be taken to do so.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
                                            
11 For a similar understanding of the relationship between policy-discourse, legitimacy and social expectations, 
see: (Seabrooke 2007b; 2007a, 3) 
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This paper adopts just one of a number of possible interpretations of the post-war world and 
the political context of the process of integration. It makes certain assumptions about the 
long-term intentions of the founding states and the nature and legitimacy of state power, 
matters over which different political theories disagree. In order to justify the assumptions 
made, it is important to reflect upon the different ways in which the process of integration has 
been understood in the literature and more firmly place the EU in its historical context.12 
 
The argument advanced in this paper is that the state exists to perform those actions that must 
be performed collectively if they are to serve the interests of all. It argues that state legitimacy 
depends upon there being a shared conception of social justice between citizen and state: 
agreement over what action the state should take and how, if it is to serve this collective 
interest. In the post-war environment, state legitimacy was increasingly seen to be linked with 
the extent to which it secured the basic well-being of its citizens, and therefore linked with 
meeting welfare requirements.  This paper explains the emergence of the EU by reference to 
its functional importance in the post-war environment in ensuring states could do this.  
 
It is important to demonstrate that proceeding on the basis of these assumptions, given the 
theoretical and practical consequences which flow from them, is a potentially productive way 
of obtaining an insight into the EU’s changing conception of social justice. The exploration 
of various theories of European integration below illustrates that, in accordance with the 
assumptions made in this paper, there is broad consensus that European integration was 
linked to the perceived need for the state to act in the interest of its citizens, however that 
interest is conceived. 
 
Milward and Moravcsik13 have been powerful proponents of the view that short-term 
economic interests14 were the driving force behind integration.15 Milward particularly argued 
that the fundamental changes in the post-war environment, and the resulting transformation in 
                                            
12 There is a vast literature on the history of European integration. This project necessarily confines itself only to 
an overview. 
13 (Milward and Sørensen 1945; Moravcsik and Katzenstein 1998) 
14 Moravcsik promoted the view that it is commercial interests that determine the preference of states. 
(Moravcsik and Katzenstein 1998) 
15 (Moravcsik and Katzenstein 1998) 
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the global political and economic system, meant that international relations based on 
interdependence became unsuitable for supporting states’ new domestic policies after the 
war.16 He argued that the EU was seen as a means to help states rebuild their social and 
economic capacities to enable them to pursue these policies. However, these ‘new’ policies 
were formed against a backdrop in which societies’ expectations from states were changing. 
While he argues that the purpose of the EU was to rebuild the nation state system, not to 
challenge it, it is implicit in his argument that integration was linked with the greater role that 
states believed they had to play in contributing directly to welfare, even if the EU’s 
contribution to this was intended to be primarily economic.17  
 
The Cold War, and changes in foreign relations generally, have been seen as significant in 
making inter-state co-operation seem particularly attractive throughout the 1950s.18 However, 
the influence of these factors is just one dimension of the broader transformation that was 
taking place in post-war Europe more generally. Many argue that it simply strengthened the 
appeal of economic and political integration19 by impacting on states’ perceptions of the 
limitations on their abilities to meet the changing expectations of their societies. 20  
 
Many have identified a messianic21 element in the founding documents of the EEC, 
understood to reflect the changed outlook of Europeans brought about by the war.22 It is 
suggested that citizens were no longer willing to tolerate the economic nationalism, nor the 
                                            
16 (Milward and Sørensen 1945) 
17 (Milward and Sørensen 1945; Moravcsik and Katzenstein 1998) 
18 Integration also appealed as a means to tame the security threat from the Soviet Union and from Germany: 
(Messenger 2014, 57) 
19 (Messenger 2014, 57) 
20 (Stone 2014b, 6–7) In this way it is perhaps mistaken to see all the changes taking place in the lives of 
Europeans as over-determined by the capitalism-communism rivalry. While the Cold War context provided one 
of a number of motivations behind European integration, it would be mistaken to see it as the most significant 
factor behind the creation of the EEC: (Messenger 2014, 37) see: (Dinan 2014, 37; Messenger 2014, 37)  
21 Joseph Weiler is the most well-known proponent of this view. He believes the “promise of a better future” 
was the main driver in European integration. See: (Weiler 2012, 256)   
 
22 (Weiler 1991) In particular: The Schuman Declaration, Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris.  
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inter-state conflicts, they blamed for it.23 Instead it seemed that there was a growing belief 
that international disputes should be resolved in an atmosphere of collaboration and co-
operation.24 This went hand in hand with citizens’ changing conception of the legitimacy of 
state power. This then helped to fuel the emergence of a strong federalist movement after the 
war, out of a belief that the political unification of Europe was necessary to contain the 
destructive state nationalism many blamed for oppression and economic and social decline. 
 
It has also been argued that states were acutely aware at this time that their legitimacy 
increasingly depended not only on securing the economic and social conditions being 
demanded by their people, but on guaranteeing that the oppression enabled by war could not 
happen again: long-term co-operation and a commitment to common objectives was seen to 
be a way to achieve this. 25 This reinforces the assumption that state legitimacy was heavily 
dependent upon the benefit states’ actions were seen to bring to society.   
 
This brief overview illustrates a small number of possible interpretations of the post-war 
context, and how it might have provided the impetus for the creation of an organization that 
challenged/qualified the traditional qualities of the nation-state system. The post-war 
environment changed society’s expectations, while also changing the constraints under which 
states could act. However one argues that these changed expectations and constraints were 
understood at the time, it appears that the theories of European integration explored here 
support the assumptions underpinning this paper. They reinforce the view that in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, expectations of what sort of society Europeans should 
be able to live in were changing, and that the emergence of the EEC was intimately related to 
these changes.  
  
                                            
23 There is also support for this view expressed by specific Commissioners: see (Levi-Sandri 1968) 
24 (Nicolaïdis 2013) 
 25 (Nicolaïdis 2013)  (Parsons 2003, 1–28, 20)  
 19 
 
 
 
SECTION TWO: METHODOLOGY 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
THE NATURE OF DISCOURSE 
The aim of discourse analysis is to uncover the way in which different issues are understood 
within a specific social setting. The objective is to identify institutionally embedded 
interpretative schemas that produce shared understandings of issues and events.  This paper 
assumes that policy discourses reflect a set of policy ideas formed on the basis of these 
understandings: a shared ‘conception of social justice’.  
 
Discourse is both the tool through which understandings are articulated, and the frame 
through which they are conceived. All actors in the policy-making process pursue different 
interests, but these interests are themselves conceived through a particular discursive frame in 
a particular institutional and social context. 
 
DISCOURSE IN THE EU 
Discourse must be understood in its historical, institutional and social context, and in light of 
the rules that affect policy-making and discourse production.26  A number of significant 
changes to the Treaty and to the policy-making framework take place during the period 
studied and it is clear that the discourse changes significantly in light of them. However, 
changes in the language and framing of the discourse cannot necessarily be equated with a 
change in the underlying conception of social justice.  
 
It is important to recognise that changes in the legal and policy-making framework are 
changes internal to the EU; they should not be seen as exogenous factors because they are 
given meaning only when internalised through discourse. They do not determine the EU’s 
conception of social justice. The discourse articulates how these background factors have 
                                            
26 (RADAELLI and SCHMIDT 2003)  
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been interpreted and understood, in light of the conceptual frame – the conception of social 
justice – through which it is produced.   
 
To truly engage with the discourse, it is necessary to be aware of changes in the legal and 
policy-making context, in order to be able to identify which changes suggest a change in the 
underlying conception of social justice, and which might be attributable to the particular legal 
constraints under which the discourse is being produced at a particular time.  
 
In light of this, in this paper, each section of the analysis is preceded by a short overview of 
the background and context, including reference to the important legislative developments 
and policy-strategies and systematic reference is also made to such factors throughout the 
analysis itself. Further information is provided in Annex 1.  
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology has been constructed by drawing on different approaches to discourse 
analysis, particularly those associated with more recent social constructionist approaches to 
the study of European integration.27 It has drawn on the idea of the ‘ideal-type’ to formulate 
the conceptual framework through which this discourse is analysed. It denotes a discourse as 
being ‘dominant’ when it remains relatively stable over time and is conveyed consistently 
within and between the majority of sources.  
PERIODIZATION 
The paper identifies five different periods in the history of the EU that it treats separately for 
the purposes of the analysis. These are distinguished on the basis of the existence of subtle 
differences and nuances in the different dominant conceptions of social justice that have 
stabilised for a particular period of time.  
 
                                            
27 (Jørgensen, Pollack, and Rosamond 2007, 59) – primarily associated with scholars such as Dietz and Waever: 
(‘Discursive Approaches’ 2004) 
 In addition, ideas associated with discursive institutionalism have been influential: (RADAELLI and 
SCHMIDT 2003)  
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The first period (1958-1979) is one in which the conception of social justice underpinning the 
discourse remains relatively consistent. The subsequent periods are all underpinned by a 
Market Model conception of social justice.28  Although the meaning of the concept of the 
‘free market’ at the heart of the conception differs between them, and there are also subtle 
nuances in the way that the different aspects of the conception of social justice are 
understood, 1979 marks a turning point in this respect.  
SOURCE SELECTION 
The primary sources relied on for the research were policy-documents and speeches produced 
by the European Commission. The Commission’s independence, its formal right of initiative, 
and its role in policy communication, suggested that relying on these sources was a useful 
way to ascertain a representative ‘EU’ discourse within the time constraints of the project. 
The process of source selection was continuous, undertaken both in advance to and 
contemporaneously with the analysis. 
 
The approach taken to source selection was influenced by the need to reduce the risk of 
overlooking relevant sources,29 to reduce the impact of any selection bias,30 or of over-
representing the perspective of either the Commission, or a specific Directorate General.   
 
The paper does not attempt to present in detail all the analysis that has been undertaken. It 
covers only two periods in detail and given that this is a legal paper, an analytical, narrative 
style has been adopted and the sources and the empirical work are referred to 
contemporaneously with making a particular argument. However, a conscious attempt has 
been made to draw as much detail as possible into the narrative, to enhance transparency and 
open the interpretation of the sources up to scrutiny. While quotes and extracts have been 
                                            
28 This refers to the ideal-types formulated in Section Three.  
29 The risk of overlooking relevant sources was mitigated by systematic searching and re-searching and by 
cross-referring between documents. References found in secondary literature were also carefully followed-up.  
In order to search for and access documents, the Archive of European Integration was relied on; 
http://aei.pitt.edu, the website of the European Commission and their access to documents page: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/index_en.htm, and EUROPA: 
http://europa.eu/publications/official-documents/index_en.htm, and EUr-lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-
access.html as well as the webpages for specific DGs and for different Colleges of the Commission.  
30 The risk of selection bias was addressed by exploring additional primary and secondary sources to check the 
consistency and reliability of the analysis.   
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selected to support and illustrate the argument being made, at times quotes have also been 
selected specifically to illustrate the potential ambiguity of a particular statement/discourse. 
 
The analysis has attempted to present the discourse that is most representative of the sources. 
For the two periods addressed in detail, only the most well-known sources have been referred 
to expressly. This represents a small fraction of the total number of sources analysed in detail 
when ascertaining the most accurate description of the dominant discourse,  itself just a small 
fraction of the total number of sources that have been analysed and used for the purposes of 
verification throughout the entire project. A breakdown of the sources by period is included 
in Annex 1.  
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SECTION THREE: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE EU AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
There are different perspectives on what makes the exercise of decision-making power by the 
state legitimate. This means that different theories of the nature of the state influence how one 
might defend or justify the EU’s exercise of decision-making power. On the basis of the 
premises advanced so far in this paper, one potentially useful interpretation is that its 
legitimacy, as with the exercise of state power, lies in the contribution it makes to welfare; 
the extent to which it creates the type of society citizens believe to be socially just.  
 
The EEC was established as a result of decisions taken by the governments of the six 
founding states. The nature of the post-war world is broadly accepted, in one way or another, 
to have been an important factor in explaining why these decisions were taken when they 
were. Given the assumptions made above about the legitimacy of the exercise of state power, 
the legitimacy of establishing the EEC can be understood on the assumption that states 
believed that this would be conducive to meeting the present and future needs of their 
societies. This paper makes the argument that EU power must therefore be legitimate only to 
the extent that it seeks to satisfy those needs however that concept of need is interpreted. This 
means that if member states, citizens and the EU hold conflicting conceptions of social 
justice, there will be disagreement over what action by the EU is legitimate, and which goals 
member states and citizens expect it to set and achieve.  
 
Given that the EEC did not purport to replace the nation-state,31 this implies that the 
legitimate action that the EEC could take, would be limited to that which it believed to be 
necessary to supplement nation-states’ efforts to meet the welfare requirements of their 
societies: preventing states from acting in ways that might compromise their ability to meet 
these requirements, while refraining from acting in ways that might compromise their ability 
to do so.    
This suggests that the EU’s conception of social justice, and therefore its view of how welfare 
requirements should be met, should determine its understanding of what action should be 
taken, how it should be taken, and who should be responsible for carrying it out.  It means 
                                            
31 Even if there were certain ‘federalists’ that believed it was the beginning of a process intended to do so. 
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that the extent and nature of EU action should be dictated by its assessment of what welfare 
requires, what states need to ensure these requirements are met, and what citizens expect.    
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
This paper assumes that to understand whether something accords with principles of social 
justice is to assess whether some action or institution serves a purpose that honours or 
advances some important human good: whether it contributes to what it is believed is good 
for human life. This means that a given conception of social justice revolves around what its 
proponents believe human welfare requires, and how they think its requirements should be 
met. 32  
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
On this basis, a list of questions can be formulated, the answers to which will give rise to a 
particular conception of social justice. 33 Breaking down these elements in this way helps to 
illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of conceptions of social justice, and the many possible 
ways in which such conceptions might differ.  
 
One world-view question: The most basic question to be addressed relates to one’s world-
view – one’s understanding of the way the world works. Is the world a ‘material’ reality or is 
the world, and the individuals within it, ‘socially constructed’? This question should be born 
in mind at all times when interpreting the discourse.  
 
Four “welfare” questions: The different conceptions of welfare can be broken down into 
four key questions:  
(1) Focus:34 What is the nature of the person whose welfare one is concerned with: are 
people self-interested actors, or are they socially embedded?  What are the boundaries 
between the state, society and the market and what is the relationship between them? 
What does the idea of citizenship convey? Do individuals come pre-formed with 
                                            
32 The term ‘welfare’ is used synonymously with ‘well-being” and the satisfaction of ‘needs’: one fares well to 
the extent that one’s needs are being met.  
33 The questions have been formulated after extensive reference has been made to different theories of welfare, 
and the main points of contention have been drawn out.  
34 This draws on different theories of the nature of public service and of citizenship and society. See: (Prosser 
2005)(Gewirth 1998; Faulkner 1998) (Delanty 1998, 1–3); (Schweizer 2011) 
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exogenous preferences, or are preferences and value socially constructed? Is there a 
collective dimension to welfare, or is individual welfare all that is important? 
(2) Quality:35 What is the ‘end point’ of welfare: do we aim at individual self-
satisfaction, or a higher sense of self-realisation/flourishing?  
(3) Scope: What is the scope of the enquiry: Is the market a sufficiently broad area of 
interaction and the main arena for the enhancement of welfare, or are there other 
important spheres of social interaction? Should policy be concerned with the market 
and the world of work, or does it need to consider all spheres of life? In what capacity 
are policy subjects conceived? 
(4) Distribution: What is the distributional dimension of welfare: does welfare require 
that policies continuously increase aggregate welfare, or do they also need to enhance 
access to basic goods, equality of opportunity, and the equal distribution of welfare?  
Three practical questions: The answers to the above questions will give rise to a particular 
view of what welfare is, and therefore what welfare requires. This will give rise to three 
practical questions relating to how these requirements should be met.  
 
(1) Relationship: What is the relationship between the objective of economic growth and 
enhancing welfare? Is there a presumption that pursuing economic growth is the most 
effective way to increase welfare, or might economic growth be insufficient, or even 
counter-productive? Do policies contribute to welfare indirectly, by contributing to 
the achievement of economic objectives, or do policies contribute directly, pursuing 
independent objectives that have intrinsic importance?   
(2) How: How does one know what individuals need to enhance welfare: Is there a 
universal, objectively identifiable set of human needs that must be satisfied to 
enhance welfare, or is human need entirely a product of individual subjective 
interpretation?  If need is subjective, how can policy be formulated appropriately? 
Whose interests should have priority? 
                                            
35 The distinction drawn distinguishes between those theories of welfare that are often described as “desire-
based” and those described as “virtue-based”. The idea of human flourishing is referred to in a broad sense. This 
term is derived from the Aristotolean conception of “Eudaimonia” but has been interpreted in a number of ways 
by different scholars working in this field: (Dean 2012; Qizilbash 1996; ‘Aristotle’s Definition of Eudaimonia’ 
2015).(Sumner 1999)(Dean 2014) 
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(3) Who: How should the responsibilities for enhancing welfare be divided? What role 
should be played by the market, the state and the EU?  How is this question to be 
decided in a given situation? Is it purely a matter of economic efficiency, or are there 
important differences between the different actors that must be considered if the 
division is to be compatible with what welfare requires?  
TWO MODELS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
In answering the questions identified above, it is possible to formulate two ‘ideal-type’ 
models of social justice.36 The analysis will not assume that the conception discerned from 
the discourse ever fits neatly within either of these models; they are merely formulated to 
ground the analysis.  
 
In this paper, a socially just society is a society in which the requirements of welfare are 
met. Consequently, to contribute to social justice is to meet the requirements of welfare 
in the manner and to the extent required by the model that is adhered to.   
 
In the table below, Model 2: Society Model often (but not always) incorporates the 
requirements of Model 1: Market Model, but in some way adds to, or qualifies it. The two 
models are explained in detail below, and summarised in Annex 2.  
 
 MODEL 1: THE “MARKET” 
MODEL 
MODEL 2: THE “SOCIETY” MODEL 
 DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE 
W
or
ld
 V
ie
w
 MARKET MODEL 
Material – the world is seen as an 
ontological reality. Individuals and the 
world ‘exist’ as objective facts. 
SOCIETY MODEL 
Constituted – The world and the individual are 
socially constructed, through discourse, language 
and perception. Individuals do not have innate 
                                            
36 The paper has deliberately refrained from identifying these models with any particular ideology in the 
interests of neutrality.  
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Individuals possess an internal sense of 
identity and this forms the basis for their 
preferences. These preferences are 
exogenously given.  Individuals attempt 
to invoke the most effective means 
available in order to satisfy them.   
values, identities or preferences, because these are 
formed through interaction. All value is 
subjective.  Meaning is a shared construct, and the 
only reality that matters is that which is perceived. 
It makes little sense to speak of optimal action 
because optimality is relative to those sharing a 
given perception of reality.  
Fo
cu
s 
Isolated – the satisfaction of individual 
desires is what contributes to welfare.  
Individuals are seen as consumers of 
public services, as holders of individual 
rights that are exercisable against other 
individuals, and protected by the State.  
All that distinguishes the individual as 
‘citizen’ from the individual as 
‘consumer’ is his participation in the 
political process, seen to be important to 
ensure that individuals’ preferences are 
taken into account when decisions that 
affect them are taken collectively.   
There is nothing tying individuals 
together except their mutual interest in 
co-existence. The role of the state is 
purely functional: States must ensure that 
the conditions that welfare requires exist 
and the services they depend on are 
provided. This can be done by 
maintaining the operation of the market 
and/or intervening where it proves to be 
insufficient to meet the requirements of 
Embedded – given that preference formation is a 
process involving social exchange, both individual 
need satisfaction and the creation of a society 
conducive to social interaction are essential to 
welfare. This means individual welfare is 
dependent upon protecting the welfare of the 
collective.  
Society is made up of a web of complex 
relationships binding individuals together. These 
relationships are the source of the social 
interaction that underpins the formation of 
individual identity, and are important for the 
protection of human dignity. There is an 
overriding belief in the essential equality of the 
human being. States are seen to owe a duty to 
individuals to protect the relationships binding 
them together and to uphold the social fabric of 
which they are a part. Individuals are not seen to 
be consumers of goods and services, but ‘citizens’ 
to whom states owe particular duties: to provide 
the conditions and services which welfare 
requires. While this can be achieved by 
maintaining the operation of the market, not all 
duties can be discharged in this way. 
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welfare (‘Market Failure’). Consultation 
of individuals contributes to welfare only 
insofar as it is seen to increase the quality 
of service provision, and maximise 
‘citizen’ satisfaction.   
 
Consequently, there are certain duties and certain 
services which the state itself must provide if it is 
to adequately protect the ‘social fabric’ that binds 
society together.  
Consultation serves the purpose of ensuring that 
all interests are considered by the state, but the 
overriding obligation of the State is to take 
decisions that serve the collective interest: 
maintaining the solidarity and cohesion which 
binds individuals together and forms the very 
basis of welfare. Consequently, the specific 
interests of individual citizens can never override 
this duty. The importance of participation in 
decision-making derives not from ensuring that 
policy serves individuals’ preferences, but from 
the contribution that participation can make to 
identity formation, and from the fact that 
participation enables the equal consideration of all 
interests in society and thus helps to uphold 
equality and protect human dignity. 
Q
ua
lit
y 
Formal – individuals are assumed to have 
pre-formed preferences, and the inherent 
ability to act rationally.  Welfare requires 
access to the means to satisfy these 
preferences, and the removal of obstacles 
preventing their satisfaction: ensuring 
personal and physical security, and 
protection from external intervention. 
This might take the form of judicial 
protection for individual rights. 
Preferences are expressed and satisfied in 
Substantive – facilitating social interaction is seen 
to be a pre-requisite to the formation of 
preferences and values. Welfare requires the 
removal of personal, social and economic barriers 
to, and opportunities and conditions for, social 
interaction as well as access to the means to live a 
life in accordance with the values that individuals 
have formed. This means that culture, leisure, 
work and the environment are all seen to be 
intrinsically important contributors to welfare.   
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the market and by exercising freedom of 
choice through the political process.   
Sc
op
e 
Economic – the market is seen to be the 
source of welfare. It ensures efficient 
distribution and maximises the resources 
available for the satisfaction of 
preferences. It operates in a way that 
maximises choice and enhances personal 
freedom.  
The scope of policy therefore extends to 
all matters linked with the operation of 
the market and the subjects of policy are 
defined by reference to their relationship 
with the market.  
Society – welfare requirements cannot be met by 
the market. Other arenas for social interaction are 
necessary for preference formation, and are 
important sources of welfare in and of themselves. 
The scope of policies must extend beyond the 
market, as policies directly contribute to 
improving living conditions and quality of life. 
Policy must be concerned with all the spheres of 
life that impact on welfare, and therefore to all 
spheres of social interaction.  
It is in their capacity as citizens that policy 
subjects are understood, they are distinguished not 
by their role in the market, but by reference to 
their specific needs and/or characteristics and are 
understood by reference to their relationship with 
society.  
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
Desert and opportunity: Welfare is served 
by enhancing aggregate welfare. 
Distribution is optimal where it is 
conducive to maximising the overall 
welfare of the whole. Given the risk that 
inequalities may themselves prove to be 
inefficient and prevent the market 
operating optimally, basic conditions of 
equality should be maintained. However, 
redistribution is rarely necessary, is an 
illegitimate interference with personal 
freedom, and should be limited to what is 
Full egalitarian: only in a society in which welfare 
is distributed equally can the scope for meaningful 
social interaction be maximised. Interference in 
the market by means of redistribution is of 
intrinsic importance if it leads to a more equal 
distribution of welfare. This is because an equal 
distribution of welfare maximises the scope for 
social interaction and thereby maximises the 
welfare of the whole, reinforcing the social 
structure upon which all individuals depend. 
Maximising the welfare of the collective, equally 
distributed, is itself vital for individual welfare.  
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conducive to increasing aggregate 
welfare.  
 
 PRACTICAL QUESTIONS 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
MARKET MODEL 
There is a strong presumption that the 
pursuit of economic growth is the most 
effective way to enhance welfare. 
Employment is seen to be important to 
enable growth to be distributed so that 
individuals have the means with which to 
satisfy their preferences. All policies 
indirectly enhance welfare through the 
contribution they make to economic 
growth and therefore the operation of the 
market. If they have a negative impact on 
economic growth or employment, they 
are not seen to be conducive to enhancing 
welfare, but are seen to be counter-
productive. As a result, economic growth 
as a means to enhancing welfare is often 
conflated with economic growth as an 
end in itself. 
SOCIETY MODEL 
There is no risk that economic growth will be seen 
to be sufficient to enhance welfare given that 
welfare requires more than the satisfaction of 
subjective preferences through the market. The 
pursuit of economic growth may even undermine 
welfare, if its pursuit proves damaging to the 
social fabric in which individuals are embedded. 
Economic growth is merely one of a number of 
legitimate objectives that have to be pursued 
through a policy mix that together combine to 
meet the requirements of welfare as equally as 
possible.  The value of each and every policy 
derives from the direct contribution it makes to 
this objective.  
H
ow
 
Subjective – Beyond the satisfaction of 
basic subsistence need, preferences as 
revealed through the market determine 
what welfare requires. This means that 
policy must be designed to maintain a 
Objective - In addition to basic subsistence needs, 
there exists an objective and universal set of needs 
that constitute pre-requisites to the subjective 
formation of preferences. There is also a set of 
values which all states must protect and uphold in 
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market in which this information can be 
obtained. Beyond maintaining the 
market, policy must be supplemented by 
consulting market actors who have 
information on how the market is 
operating in practice, and the means to 
assess ‘consumer’ preference, to provide 
information on how the market is 
operating and what policy measures are 
necessary so that it can ensure subjective 
preferences can be met.  Consultation 
with businesses is seen to be particularly 
important as businesses are seen to be the 
source of the growth on which welfare 
depends. Consultation with ‘citizens’ is 
only seen to be necessary to ensure that 
policy is aligned with individuals’ 
preferences and maximises 
‘citizen/consumer’ satisfaction, bringing 
costs and prices into alignment.  
 
society if welfare requirements can be met. This 
means that policies must be formed on the basis of 
an objective conception of what welfare requires.  
Preference and need are not revealed in the market 
alone, but in all the spheres in which social 
interaction takes place. This means that the 
objective content of policy must be supplemented 
by information obtained by consulting directly 
with a broad range of actors. Citizens themselves 
should be consulted both because of the intrinsic 
value attributed to participation, and because there 
is no presumption that specific welfare 
requirements will be revealed in the market. It is 
also necessary so that personal barriers to 
preference formation can be ascertained and given 
equal consideration.  However, specific 
preferences cannot override the  principal duty to 
ensure the objective conditions for collective 
welfare. 
 
W
ho
 
The division of competence between the 
market, the state and the EU is decided 
on the basis of economic efficiency. A 
market free from distortions is seen to be 
the most efficient way to meet welfare 
requirements. Consequently, the only role 
for the EU and states is in correcting 
market distortions and market failure, 
however conceived. The EU should 
ensure that the framework conditions for 
The division of competence between the market, 
the state and the EU takes account of the 
importance of maintaining economic efficiency. 
However, it is not appropriate for the market to set 
social standards or to undermine the social fabric 
underpinning societies. Important differences in 
the values of each state require that states retain 
the power to tailor policy objectives in such a way 
that it is able to discharge its duties to its citizens, 
and this should be allowed to compromise 
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the market’s operation are secured and 
enforced, while states should ensure that 
distortions more efficiently addressed at a 
local level, are addressed and avoided.  
Regulatory standards are set at an optimal 
level if decided by the market when 
operating under freely competitive 
conditions.  
economic efficiency to an extent – this is to be 
determined by reference to where the balance 
between economic efficiency and the need for 
state-specific measures falls from the perspective 
of ensuring the requirements of welfare are met.  
Regulation of the market is permitted above and 
beyond correction of market failure because this 
might be necessary to make the operation of the 
market compatible with other objectives 
intrinsically important to welfare, and to prevent 
social fragmentation. There is a presumption that 
state intervention in the market serves the 
collective interest.  
 
Model-1: The first model is a basic, market-oriented model, conceived in light of a material 
world-view. Its underlying assumption is that individuals are rational actors with an inherent 
capacity for forming preferences, on the basis of which they will act. What they need, and 
what welfare requires, derives from what their preferences are, and the conditions required 
for ensuring they can be satisfied.  
 
This requires a stable market that maximises quality and choice, and provides access to the 
means to take advantage of it. The state protects personal freedom in order that individuals 
can be free to maximise their own welfare. This may require the grant, and protection, of 
certain individual rights to safeguard this freedom. It is through the market, and the exercise 
of purely political, democratic rights of participation, that preferences are expressed. It is 
through political participation and democratic rights that the need for collective decision-
making is reconciled with individual freedom.  
 
Policies are legitimate only insofar as they maximise choice, employment and growth, as 
these factors ensure that welfare requirements can be met most efficiently. This means that 
the overriding objective for states is to maximise aggregate wealth. Inequality is relevant only 
insofar as it might put growth at risk.  
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Policy is to be informed by what the maintenance of the market requires. This must be 
informed by consultation with market actors, to identify market failures and distortions and to 
align production processes with consumer preferences so as to maximise efficiency. 
Decision-making responsibility must also be allocated in accordance with efficiency criteria.  
This Model will be referred to as the “Market Model.”   
 
Model-2: The second model is framed by a ‘constitutive’ world-view. It places emphasis on 
the basic equality that exists between inter-dependent human beings. Individuals’ identities 
are socially constructed – formed by interacting with others and the external environment. 
This helps them form ideas of what they value, and understand how to live their lives in 
accordance with them.  
 
To meet welfare requirements, policy should prioritise the maintenance of social 
relationships, and the maximization of opportunities for interaction and self-exploration. 
Policy is formulated objectively, from a broad consensus on what all human beings need to 
live full and meaningful lives, and what is required to uphold the values of solidarity and 
cohesion binding society together: this is necessary to serve the collective welfare on which 
individual welfare depends.  
 
It is important that citizens be directly consulted to ensure that all specific needs are given 
equal consideration, to protect human dignity and equality and to ensure that policy can, if 
necessary, be tailored to addressing particular social, economic and personal barriers to social 
participation. This ensures the whole of society can benefit from one another’s participation 
in all areas of social life.  
 
Policies are conceived in terms of the direct contribution they can make to welfare; they need 
not necessarily be conducive to maximising economic growth. It is the state’s duty to ensure 
appropriate standards are set, such that state-specific regulation of the market may be 
required, even if the effect is to ‘distort’ the market. Decision-making competence must be 
determined by balancing the need for efficiency with the overriding need to maximize the 
equal distribution of welfare.  This model will be referred to as the “Society Model.”  
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SECTION FOUR: ANALYSIS37 
As already explained, for reasons of space and in order to clarify the argument, the detailed 
analysis in this section focuses on two periods, namely 1958-1979 and 2010 - 2015.  In order 
to contextualise the analysis of these two periods, it will be helpful to begin with a brief 
overview of developments across the period as a whole, drawing on the wider body of 
research carried out for this paper (on which, see Annex 1). This research will also be 
referred to, where relevant, throughout the analysis of the two periods covered in detail.   
 
After the overview, the analysis will present in detail the discourse between 1958 and 1979 
followed by the discourse from the post-2010 period. Both sections will begin with a brief 
overview of the background and context38 and will follow with an analysis of the different 
aspects of social justice, drawing on the conceptual framework developed in the previous 
section. A summary of this framework is provided in Annex 2.  
OVERVIEW39  
The analysis suggests that the EU’s conception of social justice has changed significantly 
over time. The two periods described in detail reflect the periods in which the dominant 
conception was at its most stable, coherent and consistent.40 Most changes in the discourse 
have been gradual, but a particularly dramatic shift appears to have occurred around 1979. 
Before 1979, the Society Model conception dominates, and there is relatively little change in 
the way that the different aspects of social justice are conceived between 1958 and 1979. 
However, from 1979, while the precise contours of the conception of social justice and the 
                                            
37 Throughout this section, only the clearest examples have been quoted. References to further support for each 
substantive point can be found in the footnotes. It has only been possible to cite a small selection of the sources 
that support the point being made. In each case, a conclusion has only been drawn if the example given is 
representative of the majority of the discourse.  Page numbers have been given where possible, but sometimes 
this has been prevented by reason of the form in which the source was accessible.  
38 It has not been possible to give a detailed overview of all the important background events and changes in the 
institutional environment that have taken place during each period. Instead, a number of factors have been 
selected for each period where it has appeared from the sources that they have had an impact on the discourse 
produced.  
39 In the “Overview” section, quotes have been used for illustrative purposes, to give a very general indication of 
the overall themes of the discourse.  
40 i.e there are few competing discourse strands, and during these periods, the conception is particularly stable 
over time, within and between different sources.  
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nature and number of competing discourse strands change considerably, it is clear that the 
Market Model conception of social justice dominates.  
 
From 1979, the dominant discourse becomes what can perhaps be characterised as a ‘market 
only’ approach to social justice.41 The role that the market is seen to play then evolves 
progressively over time. The meaning of a ‘free market’ is first re-articulated, from 1985, in a 
way that portrays the market as ‘free’ only after ‘inevitable’ market failures have been 
corrected. The meaning attributed to market failure then evolves from 1985, alongside the 
changes taking place in other aspects of the discourse. The scope of intervention believed to 
be required, the means identified as appropriate, and the actors best placed to do so are 
reconceptualised in order that they make sense in light of the political and economic context, 
and the rest of the discourse. The same can be said of the way in which the discourse 
articulates the reasons for which market failure should be addressed, and how.  
 
In the late 1980s, redistributive measures are said to ensure the convergence required to 
‘correct’ the market, while in the mid-late 2000s, the discourse makes it clear that it is the 
cohesion created by investment that will do this.42 In the early 1980s, ‘vocational training’ is 
said to be necessary to facilitate adaptability and ensure flexibility in matching supply and 
demand.43 In the late 2000s it is social investment that is said to guarantee the ‘equality of 
opportunity’ that serves the same purpose. The different formulations derive from the need to 
maintain coherence with the rest of the discourse. This shows that discourse must evolve if it 
is to continue to make sense in the context of the broader political and economic context in 
which it is deployed. 
                                            
41 However, unlike in the post-2010 period, there are a number of competing discourse strands existing in some 
sources.   
42 (Commission 1985, 15; Delors 1988, 20) “Regional policy…[is] concerned with reducing structural 
differences between regions…which is an essential adjunct to the development of the internal market” 
(Commission 1985, 40) vs. “By mobilizing the potential for growth [through investment] in all regions, 
cohesion policy improves the geographical balance and raises the potential growth rate in the Union as a whole” 
(European Commission 2005b, 7) 
43 “Flexibility is the order of the day” (Thorn 1983, 13; Jenkins 1980a, 33–35) vs. “Education and investing in 
human capital formation is essential to ensure labour market participation” because “people need access to 
opportunities” (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 9)  
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After 2010, it appears that the consequences of any market failure are seen to be less 
significant than the possibility of regulatory or policy failure such that policy must be 
conceived almost exclusively in light of what the market is seen to require.   
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
As will be explained more fully in subsequent sections of the paper, from 1979, welfare is 
reduced to that which can be achieved through a competitive market - generating wealth, 
choice and enhancing freedom. This makes policies that restrict its operation appear to be 
counter-productive, reducing welfare to the satisfaction of subjective preference. This 
characterises the "Quality" dimension of social justice throughout all the following periods. 
44  
 
The scope of policy is dictated by what it is believed the market requires. Given that the 
belief is that jobs and growth are the sources of welfare, the discourse consistently expresses 
the belief that all policy objectives can be delivered through measures that focus on the 
market.45 Policy subjects are conceived in terms of the role that they play in, and their 
relationship with, the market. The citizen is equated with potential worker and/or consumer.46 
While there is variation in the way that this is framed in the discourse, this conception of the 
"Scope" dimension also remains consistent from 1979.  
 
From 1979, it is believed that increasing aggregate welfare by increasing economic growth in 
the Community as a whole is the only reason for which policy-makers should be concerned 
                                            
44Eg. “[Free Competition] is a sine qua non for a steady improvement in living standards and employment 
prospects…an essential means for satisfying to a great extent the individual and collective needs of our society”  
(F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1983, 3) See also: (F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1984b, 4) 
45 “Legislative proposals have been limited to areas where necessary to achieve the social dimension of the 
internal market” (Commission 1989, 4) “The key objectives of [social policy] will have to be the creation of 
new jobs, retaining schemes and increase in the mobility of workers” and an employment policy that contributes 
to job creation and competitiveness. (F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1984a; F. Andriessen 1981, 7) 
46 “It is in their capacity as consumer that the public is especially affected by Community action” (Commission 
1988a, 10) Women, children and the elderly are important policy subjects only by virtue of “the specific 
problems encountered by these groups on entering employment”, “the ever increasing role [they have] to play in 
the economy” and the fact that “a lack of integration is also an economic issue” (Commission 1989, 50,38,53 
respectively) 
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with inequality.47 This belief influences the way that redistributive policies are conceived in 
each of the different periods.  
 
In the 1979-1985 period, market failure is narrowly construed. Social policy is understood to 
perform an almost exclusively redistributive and costly role, rarely legitimate given that the 
optimum distribution is seen to be determined by the inherent allocative efficiency of the 
market.48 This means that equal opportunity in the market is the paramount aim, and ex-post 
redistribution justified only in very narrow situations of demonstrable market failure.  
 
From 1985, while interference with market-based allocations is still seen to be inefficient, the 
discourse expresses the belief that in order for the market to operate optimally and maximize 
aggregate growth, it actually requires some form of corrective redistributive measures, and a 
number of 'flanking' policies to support its operation. It is this that underpins the need for 
cohesion policies, and limited forms of social policy.49  
 
From 1993, it is believed that redistributive policies should be used only exceptionally, 
because the market will operate optimally only if supported by policies that are exclusively 
productive.50 It sees a greater role for the Community in regulating the market, but all 
policies are legitimate only if there is no long-term cost.51 This gives rise to a 
reconceptualisation of the role to be played by social and cohesion policies, articulated 
                                            
47 It is necessary to “protect the weakest in society” because otherwise “Europe cannot compete globally” 
(European Commission 2005a, 8)  
48 (F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1983, 2) 
49 (Commission 1990, 7) “Reform of the structural funds must…be seen in the context of stronger economic 
growth for everyone, including the most prosperous regions” (Commission 1985, 15)The role for Community 
redistributive policies is “To ensure greater stability, optimum allocation of resources…stimulate 
competitiveness and the balance distribution of wealth allowing for individual merit”(Delors 1987, 7)  
50 “The current levels of public expenditure, particularly in the social field, have become un sustainable, and 
have used up resources which could have been channeled into productive investment” (Commission 1993, 50) 
Social policy focuses on investment in “the development of human resources” as “a critical element…to 
strengthen medium term growth [and] improve the competitiveness of the European economy” (Commission 
1995, 10) Social protection is framed as a productive factor. (Commission 1998, 9) 
51 “The pursuit of high social standards should not be seen only as a cost but also a key element in the 
competitive formula” (Commission 1994, 2) 
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through the use of terms such as modernization, investment and sustainability.52 These 
concepts come to play an important role in the discourse after 2010.  
 
From the mid-2000s, the language of equal opportunities emerges more frequently in the 
discourse, and there are references to the need to equalize starting points and remedy 
disadvantage so individuals are better able to access the market and exercise their rights.53 
However, this too is seen to be instrumental for maximizing labour market participation, to 
reduce the cost of social protection, and thereby increase aggregate growth.54   
 
The way in which the conception of the "Focus" dimension evolves is the most interesting of 
all the different dimensions of welfare. It is the dimension in relation to which there are more 
competing discourses, and therefore more contestations in relation to concrete policy areas. 
This dimension will be discussed in detail in Section Five. However, it is important to 
highlight that a Society Model conception of this dimension appears to persist alongside the 
dominant discourse from 1979 to 2000, but is largely confined to the specific policy issue of 
‘social exclusion’.  
 
There is no ‘stable’ articulation of social exclusion in the discourse.55 Its relevance for 
understanding the conception of social justice can only be understood by assessing the 
purpose its deployment is seen to serve in the context in which it is being used. Social 
exclusion is acknowledged to be a ‘social problem’ such that how this problem is defined 
makes the desired ‘solution’ seem more or less appropriate or legitimate. The way the 
discourse articulates the causes of social exclusion dictates the nature of the solution, and the 
way it articulates the effect of social exclusion, influences how important it is seen to be to 
address it. In this manner, the different ways in which the concept is formulated demonstrate 
changes in the way in which the relationship between the state and the market, the state and 
society, and the individual’s place within it, are understood. 
                                            
52 “Cohesion policy…explicitly addresses economic and social inequalities…for the purpose of supporting 
economic growth and sustainable development…” (Commission 2004, 25) 
53 (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 6)  
54 (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 3,6) (Portrayed as necessary to take advantage of 
globalization, and to support the Lisbon Agenda) 
55 Others have highlighted this feature of the concept: (Armstrong 2010, 19)  
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Social exclusion is first conceived as a widespread, multi-dimensional and structural social 
problem, consistently with other aspects of the discourse articulating the Society Model 
“Focus” dimension of welfare.56 However, as the “Focus” dimension is progressively 
reconceptualised, so too is the concept of social exclusion. By the late 2000s, it is equated 
with labour market participation, the only conceptualisation that makes sense in the context 
of the rest of the discourse. After 2010, it is virtually indistinguishable from poverty: only if it 
is framed as an economic problem can it be consistent with fiscal consolidation and the belief 
that welfare depends exclusively on growth and jobs.  
 
This discourse strand notwithstanding, it is clear that the dominant conception of this 
dimension remains consistent from 1979. Further, from the end of the 1990s, competing 
discourses disappear. The form in which the dominant conception is manifested in the post-
2010 period, while framed in a different way, does not differ in substance from the way that 
this has been understood from 1979.  
 
From 1979, competition in a completely free market, combined with economic growth, is 
seen to be the best way to meet welfare requirements and is therefore treated as the overriding 
'ends' towards which all policy should be directed. While the way in which it is understood 
that policies can and do contribute to growth and competitiveness changes over time, from 
1979 the importance of public policies is seen to derive from the indirect contribution that 
they make to welfare, through the contribution they make to growth and competitiveness 
(The ‘Relationship’ aspect).57  
 
The dominant conception of the "How" aspect that emerges in 1979 remains stable 
throughout the entire period. It believes that policies should be directed towards meeting the 
needs of business and the market: maintaining a 'business friendly regulatory environment' 
becomes the primary objective of policy.58 Consultation with business is one way in which 
                                            
56 While the term is not invoked in the discourse during the first two periods, the idea of social exclusion and the 
need for policies to address it is implicit in the way that many policy objectives are conceived. See: (Levi-Sandri 
1970b, 3) (Levi-Sandri 1970a, 8) 
57 Eg. “Transforming the space…into a single dynamic and flexible market…is a goal to which all Community 
policies in their various forms must contribute” (Commission 1987, 13) 
58 “No one is in any doubt as to the responsibility of government and of the Community to create as favourable 
an environment as possible for company competitiveness” (Commission 1993, 15; Commission 2005a, 4) 
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market failure - however conceived - is believed to be identified, and therefore is an 
additional input for policy-making, particularly from 1985. However, as will be discussed in 
more detail in Section Five, participation of a progressively broader range of social actors is 
seen to be increasingly important from 1993. This eventually stabilizes as an independent 
discourse linked with the importance of participation for purposes of increasing legitimacy, 
rather than as a basis for policy-making.  
 
From 1979, economic efficiency becomes the criterion against which to decide whether the 
state, the market, or the EU should be responsible for dictating the content of policy (The 
"Who" aspect). The market, provided it is able to operate freely in practice, is seen to be the 
most efficient decision-maker in terms of standard-setting and distribution.59 This means that 
the role of the state and the EU is divided according to which party is best placed to maintain 
the conditions for the market to operate in this way.60 This is so notwithstanding that in terms 
of concrete legislative output the extent to which harmonisation legislation has been passed 
has actually varied significantly over time. This dimension has been influenced by changes in 
the economic governance framework, which have progressively limited the degree of 
autonomy that states have enjoyed. In the post 2010 period in particular, there appears to be 
an overriding presumption that state-level policy is inherently less efficient than the market 
and the Community.   
CONVENTIONAL PERIODIZATION 
There is no ‘standard’ periodization of the history of the EU; the way in which different 
periods are identified ultimately depends upon the perspective from which its history is being 
analysed. It may correspond with observed changes in the study’s object of interest (i.e the 
conception of social justice) or, particularly when the intention is to explain change, changes 
in relation to independent factors believed to be causally significant.61  
                                            
59 “The price mechanism (rather than the state) …is the most effective and also the most democratic co-
ordinator of the…decisions taken daily in the market place.” (Commission 1986, 15) 
60 Such that the Community is seen to be best placed to ensure the market operates effectively and free from 
distortion. (Commission 1988b, 25; Delors 1987, 7) 
61 For example, changes in the institutional framework, legal framework, number of states, political or economic 
context or broader ‘world’ events. 
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This notwithstanding, in terms of periodization, there is a high degree of overlap in the 
different periodizations adopted in the literature. Whether coming from the perspective of 
economic governance, social policy development, European citizenship, or political 
integration, there is a broad consensus over which periods of time should be considered as 
separate ‘phases’ in the history of the EU.  
 
Broadly speaking, the literature distinguishes the following:  
• The 1950s and 1960s  
• The 1970s and early 1980s  
• The period between the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht (1985 – 1993) 
• The period between Maastricht and the late 1990s/early 2000s (corresponding broadly 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Lisbon 
Agenda (2000))  
• The post-2004 period (corresponding with the Eastern enlargement, the failed 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and the re-launch of the Lisbon Agenda 
• The period after 2010 (corresponding with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the onset of the euro-crisis).  
The research calls into question this periodization. It suggests that changes in the discourse 
and/or the underlying conception of social justice do not always correspond with the 
traditional narrative of the history of the EU or the factors most frequently seen to be 
important in understanding the path of its evolution. 62 
 
The research calls into question the view that the period of Delors’ presidency was 
particularly significant for developing a more ‘social’ character to the Community.63 It 
questions the wealth of literature64 that refers to the late 1990s and early 2000s as if it marked 
the high point of European Social Policy.65 It implies that, for those interested in ‘locating’ 
the high point of the social dimension of the EU, it is before 1979 that one should look. This 
                                            
62Such as changes in policy-making, the legal and institutional framework, or in the political and economic 
context.  
63 The “Golden Age” of social policy: (Barbier 2013, 16:49) For more details on the sources behind these 
conclusions, see Annex 1.   
 64 (Hatzopoulos 2005, 1602; Deakin 2005; Barnard 2014; Salais 2006; Rogowski, Salais, and Whiteside 2012)   
65 Mary Daly refers to “… the Lisbon process – the EU at its most social since the Delors era during the 1980s 
and 1990s” in a recent article. (Daly 2012, 275; Barbier 2013, 16:49)  
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suggests that the ‘economic’ character of the Treaty of Rome and the progressively more 
‘social’ character of the treaties thereafter, need not necessarily indicate that there had been a 
change in the way the EU legal framework was being understood. 
 
This paper questions the commonly held view that the period between 1985 and 1993 was the 
era during which the conception of social justice was underpinned by market fundamentalism 
in its most extreme form.66 This description better fits the understanding behind the discourse 
between 1979 and 1985. Between 1985 and the late 1990s there exist a number of discourse 
strands that challenge this new ‘paradigm,’67 and only in the late 1990s does market 
fundamentalism really come to characterize the way that social justice is conceived. 
Nonetheless, within the frame of market fundamentalism, between 1979 and 2010, the 
meaning and implications of the way the “free market” is conceived, changes quite 
considerably. The post-2010 ‘free market’ is a concept with a very different meaning from 
the concept of the free market of previous periods.  
 
Finally, the research calls into question the importance the literature has attributed to certain 
events that have taken place in the broader economic and political environment in explaining 
the evolution of the EU. It challenges the view that the overall policy-orientation is 
intrinsically related to changes in the EU growth rate, because the discourse remains stable 
throughout the recession in the early 1970s, and throughout the period between 1993 and 
2010.68 It calls into question how significant events linked with the EU’s ‘legitimacy crisis’ 
have been, as neither the ‘crisis’ in the early 1970s, nor the mid-2000s has changed the 
conception of social justice underpinning the discourse.69 The paper also calls into question 
the extent to which foreign policy developments, particularly in relation to the ongoing Cold 
War context, have influenced the overall orientation of the EU.70  
                                            
66 This is understood as a strong belief in the ability of the free market to solve most – and at its most extreme, 
all - economic and social problems, such that an active role for state intervention is seen to be inimical to 
solving them. The term was popularized in (Soros 1998)  
67 I.E expressing a belief that even when perfectly competitive, the market may not be sufficient to meet welfare 
requirements.  
68 The 1993-2010 period is characterized by a considerable degree of change in the economic climate, one 
which does not appear to impact on the conception of social justice underpinning the discourse.  
69 These are two of the periods in which there were clear indications of public discontent: The 1970s marked the 
end of the post-war 'permissive consensus' and 2004 the rejection by the Dutch and French voters of the 
Constitutional Treaty. (Dinan 2014, 1; Calligaro 2013, 2; Sternberg 2013, 70–71)   
 70 See for example: (Rosato 2011)  
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The analysis also raises a number of questions that it would be useful to address in future 
research. It indicates that observable changes in social policy in terms of legislative output 
and regulatory style, do not correspond with any change taking place at the deeper level of 
the conception of social justice, or in how social problems and the role of the EU is 
conceived. It is therefore important to understand how the discourse can remain stable, while 
the outputs of policy-making change considerably. It requires further investigation into the 
way in which policy ideas are translated into concrete legislative outcomes.  
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1958 – 1979  
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
There are a number of distinguishing features to the background and context, and the sources 
available, between 1958 and 1973 as compared with 1973-1979.71 
 
The discourse during 1958-1973 is produced while the Community is taking its first steps 
towards implementing the Treaty, at the same time as it is trying to understand the Treaty and 
give itself institutional form.72 By 1973, the Community and its institutions are well 
established and have 15 years of policy-making experience behind them.  
 
There are fewer sources available, fewer policy areas,73 and fewer member states before 
1973.74 The style of policy making is different as policies are largely dictated by the Treaty's 
timetable for creating the customs union. The main sources relied upon in the analysis are 
speeches, and unlike after 1973, there are few sector-specific policy documents to assess. 
This implies that there is a greater risk of over-representing the perspective of a particular 
policy area or a particular actor in the earlier years of the Community. In addition, the reports 
and general policy documents that are produced contain predominantly technical and 
statistical language which is difficult to draw on for the purposes of the analysis, such that a 
higher number of sources have to be excluded. 
As a result of the economic situation in the EEC, particularly before the mid-1960s, 
completing the common market programme is seen to be the absolute priority.75 There is an 
urgent need to establish the basic economic structures that can provide the foundations for 
                                            
71 1973 corresponds with the period following the Paris Summit and the first enlargement of the Community, 
and broadly corresponds with the on-set of the recession.  
72 (Vauchez 2013, 6). At the outset no shared framework of understanding was immediately available, but 
occurred via a process of 'institutionalization'. On this process, see: (Vauchez 2013, 5) also citing: (Fligstein, 
McNichol, and others 1997) 
73 From the early 1970s, additional policy areas emerged in the work of the Community, and pre-existing 
policies were re-launched. For example: social policy, transport policy, development aid, environmental policy 
and consumer protection policy, a re-orientation of industrial policy, research, regional policy and the creation 
of the regional fund (18 March 1975)  
74 The UK, Ireland and Denmark join the Community in January 1973 increasing the membership from 6 to 9.  
75 This is clearly explained in the discourse: (Jenkins 1980b, 1–2) 
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economic growth in Europe, to meet the very basic needs of citizens.76 However one 
conceives of the concept of welfare, welfare requirements would not be met without such 
basic structures being in place to underpin economic development. This makes it difficult to 
interpret the discourse so as to distinguish between the two models. The ‘bigger’ questions 
over which the models differ are to emerge in later sourcesafter a basic framework for growth 
in the Community has been established. 77 
In contrast, the 1960s are a period of rapid growth in the Community, which provides a 
significant contrast to the economic recession, rising unemployment and rising inflation that 
follows the oil shock of 1973-4. It is also significant that between 1958 and1973, much of the 
discourse is dominated by the post-war and Cold War context.78 This, and the concern for 
maintaining amicable Franco-German relations, has a considerable influence on what is seen 
to be the immediate policy priorities. Given the presence of a genuine external security threat, 
basic security and territorial stability could not be assumed.79 As a result, much of the 
discourse is framed so as to emphasise to member state governments the benefits of co-
operating on the inter-state plane, primarily in terms of foreign policy. Both models see basic 
territorial security as integral to welfare, so this discourse strand is unhelpful in answering 
many of the questions posed.80 By contrast, the 1970s are characterised by a period of 
peaceful co-existence between the East and West. 81  The Community’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union, following European Political Co-operation in 1970, is more concerned with the 
development of trading relations than with defensive foreign policy.82   
                                            
76 The concern over basic housing, for example, dominated many of the earliest speeches produced by the DG 
for social affairs: (Levi-Sandri 1962b) It is also given emphasis in Initiative 64: (European Commission 1963, 
13 para. 82))  
77 The preliminary nature of the economic objectives in the Treaty is expressly acknowledged. (Commission 
1959, 8)  
78 This is particularly apparent from many speeches made by Walter Hallstein, particularly: (Hallstein 
1967)(Hallstein 1962) 
79 Pre-occupation with regaining independence from US aid, and proving the unity of Europe and its existence 
as a ‘great power’ between the East and West particularly dominate the speeches produced by Walter Hallstein 
at this time.  
80 It is in this context that the emphasis placed on the objective of peace should be understood: “The European 
Community is first and foremost a work of peace” (Hallstein 1967, 14) 
81 (Ulusoy 2015, 8)  
 
82 See generally:(Anderson, Jeffrey, J. 2014)  
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Nonetheless, despite the differences that exist in the economic and political contexts in which 
the discourse is produced, the number and nature of the sources, the number of member states 
and therefore the number of actors involved in the production of discourse, the conception of 
social justice from 1958 to 1979 remains remarkably stable and consistent, notwithstanding 
that the policy output and measures actually taken throughout the two periods, differ quite 
considerably.  
WELFARE 
The Society Model conception of welfare dominates the discourse from 1958 – 1979.  
The conception of the “Quality” dimension of welfare remains consistent from 1959 to 1979. 
Welfare is seen to consist in an objective state of well-being above and beyond preference 
satisfaction.   
 
The discourse sees welfare as requiring real freedom of choice, over where to work and over 
how to contribute to ‘all walks of life,’  to work and to society.83 Improving living and 
working standards84 is equated with improving the ‘overall conditions of existence’ for the 
individual:85  
“In the Community…the number of those who do not enjoy…a minimum standard of life is 
important. Guaranteeing to these persons a minimum income which allows them not just to 
subsist, but to live decently, is a duty of states and of the Community…not limited to 
guaranteeing resources to disadvantaged persons…but providing the conditions for true 
fulfilment, participation in decision-making and integration into society.”86 …“Particularly in 
a society of abundance, [we] often forget the essential requirements in the fields of health, 
education, housing…it is also vital that the individual should have a sense of purpose in his 
place of work and in society and should be able in both spheres to assume his own share of 
                                            
83 This is implied in the social policy guidelines: (Commission 1971a)  See also: (Commission 1973c, 15) 
 
84 (1957, Art.2) 
85 (Malfatti 1970a, 5)  
86 (Levi-Sandri 1970b, 3) ‘True fulfilment’ is alluded to elsewhere: education is “a basic human need and 
right”…necessary to “enable the worker to realise his full potential” not just in the labour market, but in life 
more generally. (Commission 1973c, 15)  
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responsibility [while] the natural balances in our human environment must be re-established 
and preserved.”87  
 
The Social Action Programme expressly rejects the view that increasing economic prosperity 
is by itself sufficient to lead to the “improved quality of life which our people rightly 
expect…"88 Providing growth and employment is not seen to enhance welfare unless the 
conditions of that employment, and the processes generating growth, adhere to particular, 
objective, values of dignity. In the competition policy sources, the discourse sees social and 
economic progress as dependent not only on future growth and employment, but also on 
ensuring that full employment is secured “in conditions of human dignity and satisfaction."89 
It is seen to be necessary to humanise work, guaranteeing not just employment, but job 
enrichment.90 Beyond work, the purpose of economic union is to enable development, a 
concept that goes beyond satisfying the material conditions of existence: “problems of the 
environment, urban areas, transport, the home, health conditions, schools and permanent 
education, aid to the aged, organisation of culture and leisure all form part of the overall plan 
to create a community advancing in peace and freedom, affording every man the means 
whereby he can enhance his dignity”.91  
 
The Society Model conception of the “Focus” dimension is also consistently evident in the 
discourse. The state is seen to have a responsibility for providing a specific type of social 
environment.92 Where inequalities exist, growth conflicts with society’s values, leads to a 
deterioration of the natural environment, or fails to secure worker participation, the operation 
of the market may be politically unacceptable.93   
                                            
87 (Levi-Sandri 1970a, 8)  See also discourse in environmental policy documents:  (Commission 1976a, 11; 
Commission 1975a) 
88 (Commission 1973c, 13) 
89 (Vouel 1977b, 1)  
90 (Commission 1976c; Commission 1973c)(Commission 1976b, 32) See also the focus on humanisation 
in:(Shanks 1974, 2)  
91 (Malfatti 1970a, 5) 
92 (Malfatti 1970a, 5) Malfatti states that higher growth necessarily means the state and the Community have a 
responsibility to make sure that the plan [for development] is realised. 
93 (Commission 1973c, 13) 
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The individual is seen to be embedded in a social network underpinned by solidarity and 
equality, with individual welfare dependent on the welfare of the collective.94 Concern is 
expressed for both individual welfare and “satisfying collective needs” thereby calling for an 
overall policy “for society, striving to improve the quality of life, working conditions and the 
environment.” 95… “Economic and Monetary Union is worth achieving overall because it 
will provide a solid basis on which could be built…a policy for society.” It would take the 
Community “beyond its present role as market controller and organizer [so it] will become a 
political centre…based on solidarity and equity.” 96 The idea of European Union is seen to be 
a matter of preserving and fortifying “our peace and liberty… justice for all, individual 
freedom and intellectual integrity…[and] a sense of social fairness.” 97   
 
This discourse constructs a view of the Community in light of a particular conception of what 
the idea of society demands: a form of public power that not only controls the market, but 
intervenes to promote solidarity and equity, defending the collective interest from any 
negative effects caused by the market. It expresses a particular conception of the role of the 
state, and constructs its own role in light of what the Community must do to supplement it as 
a result of the creation of the common market.   
 
The state’s duty to uphold social values and protect the collective interest is seen to be more 
important than increasing growth: “Basing one’s own actions on the hypothesis of growth 
does not….mean acquiescing lazily and optimistically in the illusion that all growth is 
inherently beneficial. The truth is rather to the contrary…ecological needs pose a first, severe 
                                            
94 “All present day development must be directed towards the individual, who should enjoy, thanks to such 
development, improved possibilities of advancement, which will help him in his turn to contribute in greater 
measure to the well-being of society”(Levi Sandri 1964, 2) See also the “double commitment to individual 
freedom on the one hand and to social justice on the other” where “both halves should count equally”: (Jenkins 
1978, 2) 
95(Commission 1973a, 5) The Community has no environmental policy competence at this time, and there is no 
DG for environment. Nonetheless, during the 1970s the Commission presented the first Environmental Action 
Programme and by 1981 a DG for environment was established. See also: (Commission 1976c, 3) 
96 (Altiero Spinelli 1973, 2) 
97 (Jenkins 1977, 3) 
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constraint…so too [does] quality of life at the daily workplace and elsewhere.” The discourse 
stresses that improving the working environment and enriching work takes priority.98  
 
This is highly indicative of the features of the Society Model, and is evident in many areas of 
the discourse:  
 
The discourse in competition policy conceives state aid,99 crisis measures100 and the 
importance of the public provision of services on this basis.101 They are primarily seen to be 
important for efficiency reasons,102 but the Competition Commissioner adopts a sensitive 
approach to the issue, proposing to clarify with governments the principles on which state 
undertakings should operate.103 While the discourse indicates that efficiency considerations 
are seen to be extremely important, the matter is treated far more sensitively than in 
subsequent periods.104 The discourse suggests that the Commission is suspicious that many 
policies adopted during the economic recession are pursuing (protectionist) economic aims, 
rather than being adopted for social reasons linked with the collective interest. While state 
intervention does not enjoy a presumption of legitimacy even in this early period, the 
legitimacy of the public character of a particular service is not solely determined by 
efficiency criteria: either the collective interest or market failure might justify the restriction 
on competition imposed.105  
                                            
98 (Altiero Spinelli 1972b, 2) Quality of life includes "environmental aspects like forestation and lack of 
pollution, public transport, and improving the quality of life of the citizens of Europe at their daily workplace 
and elsewhere” and includes strategies to “enrich work and respond to the basic human need for participation in 
decision-making"  
99 The general discourse and the first competition policy report is consistent with this: (European Commission 
1972, 17)  
100 (Vouel 1977a, 10) : Expressing disappointment that there is little room under the Treaty to “pursue measures 
that are acknowledged to be in the common interest” to enable struggling industries to find their way out of 
difficulties as smoothly as possible.   
101 (Commission 1978, 28)  
102 (Vouel 1977a, 10) Before the mid-1970s, the impact of the Community rules on state enterprises is still being 
investigated and no approach yet developed. But see:(European Commission 1972, 47)   
103 (Vouel 1977b, 4) 
104 It is not immediately clear that it is efficiency that is seen to be the reason for the public character of a 
service: recognition is given to states’ “legitimate wish to safeguard the effectiveness of public undertakings” 
implying that effectiveness is not solely a matter of efficiency. (Commission 1977, 144) 
105 The discourse supports intervention to encourage 'social innovation' in the collective interest: (Shanks 1974, 
9) 
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By contrast with the post-2010 discourse, the economic recession of the 1970s does not 
appear to call into question the importance of state expenditure on social policy 
“but…[requires] strengthening the consensus within our societies about an equitable balance 
between private and public consumption...”106 In contrast to the modernization discourse 
found in the context of the post-2008 recession, the value of solidarity and the role of public 
authorities in protecting it, is implicit in the discourse and the context of economic recession 
does not appear to change this. 107 
 
The environmental policy sources clearly illustrate the dominance of the Society Model 
conception of the “Scope”, “Focus” and “Quality” dimensions. The Community definition 
of ‘environment’ is stated to include “all those elements which, in an intricate relationship, 
form the surroundings, setting and the living conditions of man and society, as they are or as 
they are experienced.” 108 This includes the physical environment, the social environment - 
“the material and immaterial109 elements that form the setting and conditions of our lives 
(housing, means of transport, the infrastructure for providing care, amenities, culture…the 
chance to educate oneself, to act freely, to expand one’s life),” 110 the improvement of welfare 
systems, income, job security, working conditions, housing and education” - and also the 
cultural environment “the preservation of urban and rural sites of interest and beauty spots, 
the improvement of teaching and information, cultural and leisure activities”111 Individuals 
are clearly seen to be embedded within a particular social, physical and cultural context, one 
which not only forms the background conditions for life, but which is actively experienced by 
“man and society” in a way that makes an important contribution to welfare.  This discourse 
attributes intrinsic value to social experience beyond the market. 
                                            
106(P. Hillery 1975) (Commission 1978, 28)  
107 “Limits must be set to the self-interest of social groups. Demands made on society must be accompanied by 
correspondingly high returns by the group: the social groups must put their own particular interests further 
behind those of the public as a whole… the duty of public authorities is to represent with appropriate 
determination the interests of the general public…” (Commission 1976c, 5)  “We must find the opportunity of 
taking Community solidarity further” (Ortoli 1973, 8) 
108 (Carpentier 1972, 1) See also: (Commission 1972, 10) (Commission 1976a, 11; Commission 1975a) 
109 See also reference to psychological needs of workers: (Shanks 1974, 3)  
110 (Carpentier 1972, 2) 
111 (Commission 1972, 11) 
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The sources support the view that the Society Model conception of the “Distribution” 
dimension of welfare dominates, notwithstanding that the discourse admits that by the 1970s, 
the Community has failed to ensure fair distribution and to remedy social inequalities in 
practice.112 The understanding of what policy should be trying to achieve remains consistent: 
it should achieve an equal distribution of welfare because increases in aggregate wealth is 
seen to be insufficient.113 In line with the Society Model conception of both the “Focus” and 
“Distribution” dimensions, and in marked contrast with the post-1979 discourse, solidarity 
is understood to require a fair distribution of welfare even at the expense of aggregate growth. 
114   
“Economic growth can be regarded as optimum growth only if, at the same time, some 
degree of harmony is achieved in the relative development of the different social groups, if 
the gap between the level of development in the various areas making up the territory of each 
member states is narrowed and if the gap between average standards of living throughout the 
community is reduced.”115 The overriding concern for ensuring the fair distribution of 
welfare, between individuals, social groups and between regions, is frequently made 
explicit.116  “A real political union will be possible only if the Communities secure effective 
social justice, a fairer distribution of created wealth between the social classes…”117 In 
contrast with the discourse from 1979, the discourse does not frame divergent conditions by 
reference to the problems they might pose to aggregate growth. Instead, concerns over 
                                            
112(Commission 1973c, 13)  
113 (Malfatti 1970a, 8) “Economic growth must be used to raise living standards, but the goal of “greater social 
justice” is ultimately about fair distribution of income and wealth”…”Satisfactory economic growth, a high 
level of employment, balanced payments and stable prices” are “only acceptable if the distribution of these 
incomes improves simultaneously” (Commission 1971a, 46) “From the social point of view, it is not sufficient 
to know if wealth has increased, and by how much, but also knowing how it has been distributed, and the 
benefits distributed" (Levi-Sandri 1970a, 1) Industrial policy “must increasingly pursue qualitative objectives...a 
narrowing – with improvements for everyone – of the disparities of all types that still separate men according to 
the social or occupational group and the region or nation they belong to, the improvement of working 
conditions, the level of education, the protection of the natural environment…” (Commission 1970, 6–7) 
114 (Levi-Sandri 1970b, 4) 
115 (Commission 1966a, II 26) Repeated in the policy guidelines: III-2.  
116 (Levi-Sandri 1962a, 4–5) Stating that regardless of the motives that underpinned the inclusion of Art.119 in 
the treaty, there was “no doubt that equal pay has a clear function in each modern state, of establishing true 
equity between various social strata so as to give a genuine content to the principles of liberty and 
equality…principles that should not merely be paid lip service” 
117 “…Political union would not be possible and not strike root properly in democracy and liberty if, within 
itself, it allowed of widely ranging social structures neither justified nor justifiable on particular grounds” (Levi-
Sandri 1962a, 7 and 15) See also: (Commission 1966a, I–5) 
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distribution are seen to stem from the intrinsic importance of the value of solidarity: fair 
distribution is seen to be necessary to ensure fairness in “the breakdown of overall income in 
favour of low income groups”… "if the relative income of certain social groups or 
occupations needs to be improved, the overall increases in other income categories will have 
to be a little less.” 118 
 
This perspective is maintained even in the context of the recession.119 The discourse changes 
after 1973 only in the sense that, given the basic structures for growth are now well-
established, there is no longer seen to be any excuse for social inequalities to exist: “The 
Community has now reached a stage in its economic development when it can, and indeed 
must, afford to question more critically the pattern and the costs of economic growth and the 
distribution of its resources.”120 which now also includes a fairer distribution of economic 
power.121  
 
It is clear that rising unemployment, inflation and recession are not seen to justify prioritising 
aggregate wealth over tackling inequalities. It suggests that the rising inequality with which 
citizens are dissatisfied in the 1970s results from the fact that Community policies are not 
delivering in practice the results the Community expected, rather than from a misalignment 
between what citizens and the Community believe it should be trying to achieve.  
 
The Society Model conception of the “Scope” dimension of welfare stays consistent 
throughout this period. Nonetheless, it is clear that the actual policies produced before and 
after 1973 are quite different. In the first period, concrete policy proposals are framed in a 
way that might suggest that economic actors are the main policy subjects. Measures 
connected with, and concerns over the conditions relating to the world of work dominate the 
                                            
118 (Commission 1966a, III–20) See also concern that economic policy make a contribution to raising the 
standard of living and improving the quality of life and to “a greater community of action in support of the 
underprivileged” (Commission 1971b, 10)   
119 The discourse stresses that a pre-requisite to wage restraint must be a more equitable distribution of wealth, 
income and economic power. It suggests that the pursuit of growth might become unacceptable, because of its 
impact on the distribution of income and wealth and on worker participation.  (Haferkamp 1976, 8–10)  
120 (Commission 1973c, 14) 
121 Instrumental in reducing inequalities, and also as an intrinsically important aim: (Haferkamp 1976, 8–10) See 
also:(Shanks 1974, 3)   
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discourse.122 Policy subjects are often referred to as workers, perhaps suggesting that it is 
believed that the income generated and expended in the market is sufficient to ensure welfare 
requirements are met. The discourse refers to ‘living and working conditions’ usually when 
speaking of the worker. Free movement is understood in a similar way: “the individual’s right 
to choose to work in another member state if he thinks his prospects may be better there, is 
one of the Community’s main social advantages for workers…”123  
 
While these features may suggest a Market Model conception of the “Scope” dimension, this 
interpretation is unconvincing when taken in context.  The Community’s concern for welfare 
appears to extend far beyond market-based mechanisms and market actors. The frequent 
references that are made to the working and living conditions of labour and workers has to be 
understood against the backdrop of the language employed in the Treaty, and the limits on 
competence it contains.124 The work-focussed terminology does not conflict with the fact that 
the Community sees its objective as contributing to the welfare of all of society. It shows 
how background factors,  such as the limited role the Community feel able to play within the 
political and institutional constraints in which it is operating, influence the way discourse is 
articulated.125  
 
This has to be contrasted with the 1970s, when there is broad consensus between the different 
institutions and the member states on the need to give the Community a ‘human’ face, and it 
is this that facilitates the development of an independent social action programme, and a re-
orientation of policy around more purely ‘social’ aims after 1973, but not before.126  
                                            
122 (Commission 1971a, 51–52; Levi-Sandri 1962b; Levi-Sandri 1965; Levi-Sandri 1970a) 
123 (Hallstein 1966a) 
124 Notwithstanding the labour focus of social policy, “all 170 million Community citizens have an interest in 
Community Social Policy" (Levi-Sandri 1962a, 2) 
125 A series of events in the early 1960s, culminating in the empty chair crisis of 1965, weakens the Community 
institutions and generates rifts between the member states. This leads to strategic use of the veto in the Council, 
and a degree of legislative deadlock. These circumstances are referred to in the discourse: Harmonization in the 
social field is seen as essential notwithstanding the limited powers enjoyed under the treaty:(Commission 1972, 
13 paras. 78–82) (Sandri 1966, 5) 
126 See the Final Declaration of the Paris Summit: “Economic expansion is not an end in itself. Its firm aim 
should be to enable disparities in living conditions to be reduced. It must take place with the participation of all 
Social Partners. It should result in an improvement of the quality of life as well as standards of living” it also 
stated that the member states “attach as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as to the 
achievement of the economic and monetary union” (Council 1972, 14) See also: (Kenner 2002, chap. 2)  
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Even before 1973, the discourse frequently refers to the treaty objective of improving living 
and working conditions127in the context of improving the quality of life128 of the citizen, and 
not just the worker.129 Competition policy is not seen to be confined to the economic sphere 
but directed at “those that contribute to economic, and social life.”130 The discourse 
emphasizes that the main objective of the Community is the “progressive improvement of the 
living and working conditions of citizens in all walks of life.” 131 Similarly, in contrast to 
much of the post-2000 discourse, the social problem of ‘exclusion’ is not seen to be a 
problem deriving from being excluded from the labour market, but from the ability to benefit 
from general well-being.132 Policy subjects are frequently referred to in terms such as 
‘citizen’, ‘individual’, ‘man’ and ‘people’ even if Community measures are concerned with 
matters affecting workers.  
Meeting the requirements of welfare is seen in terms of what the Community order as a 
whole – policy measures taken at both Community and state level – can achieve, based on a 
particular conception of the state’s role in guaranteeing welfare.133 States are expected to use 
policy to ensure the welfare requirements of non-economic actors, and social problems 
extending beyond the market, are addressed.134 There is little doubt that meeting these 
requirements is seen to be a crucial part of what Community policy is designed to achieve.135 
                                            
127 (Commission 1971a) 
128 (Mansholt 1972b) 2 
129 (Commission 1971a, 52) (Commission 1971b, I–2) 
130 (Commission 1962, 20)  
131 (Commission 1966a, I–5) 
132 “As more and more people are enjoying a better life, it is wrong that millions capable of leading a normal, 
decent life, should be excluded from the general well-being” (Commission 1971a, 46)  
133 (Commission 1971a, 48) “The Community must be able to back measures taken in Member countries to 
improve the distribution of incomes or to implement reforms aimed at greater social justice” (Commission 
1971a, 49) 
134 Similarly, after 1973 welfare is seen to relate to matters such as “the content of work, better chances to find 
work, making lives more purposeful and rewarding and a framework for more satisfaction in life away from 
work” (Jenkins 1977) (Commission 1973b, 6)  
135 (Levi-Sandri 1970a, 8) 
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The difference after 1973, however, is that the member states have now implicitly endorsed 
the use of existing treaty competences as a basis for more concrete Community initiatives.136   
It is clear that social policy objectives are seen to have intrinsic importance, independent 
from the economic objectives that the creation of the common market was designed to 
realise. “That social questions, though very much at the fore at the national level, might seem 
to be ill defined at Community level, cannot justify a passive social attitude on the part of the 
Community institutions.”137  
 
The logic of the approach is explained in a speech made by Patrick Hillery in 1975. 138 
Referring to the 1950s and 60s: while “concrete social measures at Community level were 
only felt to be needed if the free movement of goods, services or labour might be impeded by 
inconsistent social provisions”… “it would be wrong to get the impression that Community 
social policy during this period was entirely dominated by economic concerns. Many people, 
both inside the Commission and outside….sought to make the European Community into a 
positive instrument for improving the standard of living and working conditions of the whole 
Community population.”139  It is clear that this remained the case after 1973.  
 
In the 1970s, while the scope for a greater role for the Community in contributing to ‘social’ 
objectives is increased by a number of changes in the political context, and the measures 
adopted by the Community change quite considerably, the discourse remains consistent from 
1958. 140 It stresses that for each Community policy, the Commission “must ask how will this 
improve the lot of the European citizen?” 141 because “all our actions must be guided by 
                                            
136 (1957, Art. 100 EEC and 235 EEC) See: (Kenner 2002, 23)These articles were endorsed at the Paris Summit 
and expressly referred to in some of the sources: (Commission 1973c, 14) 
137 (Commission 1962, 44) 
138 Vice-President of the Commission with special responsibility for social affairs 1973-1976 
139 (P. J. Hillery 1975c) See also: “... the object of the harmonisation of social systems is not only the levelling 
or alignment of employers’ charges and obviating distortions of competition, it is primarily to forge an 
instrument of social progress and betterment, towards a higher standards of living for all categories of workers” 
(Levi-Sandri 1962b, 7) 
140 Not only is the climate for action to develop a Community social policy more favourable, but the possibility 
of passing legislation through the Council is increased with the departure of De Gaulle in 1969 and, along with 
the relative consensus between the states at this time, the hurdle imposed by the Luxembourg Compromise and 
the need for unanimity in the Council is considerably reduced.  
141 (Jenkins 1977, 10) 
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human concern.”142It does not see the main policy subjects as market-actors: “Europe has 
direct relevance not only to the members of our economies, but to combating the ugliness and 
frustrations and injustices of every day life…[to the] transcendental purposes of world peace 
and human freedom.” 143 requiring a “more active community social policy if the well-being 
of all peoples of the Community is to be maintained.”144 Policies with direct impact on 
individuals in capacities other than that of their role in the market increase in number during 
this period, and this is clearly evident in the sources analysed. However, from 1958 to 1979, 
the discourse is consistent as to what the Community order as a whole is seen to be intended 
to achieve in light of the particular political and legal constraints to which it is subject.  
This clearly shows that despite significant changes taking place within and outside the 
Community throughout this period, a relatively consistent Society Model conception of 
welfare is dominant from 1958 to 1979.  
RELATIONSHIP  
The Society Model conception of this aspect of social justice dominates the discourse. The 
discourse does not conflate economic growth with meeting welfare requirements, nor express 
a belief that all policies contribute to welfare only indirectly through the contribution they 
make to economic growth. It is clear that all policy areas are seen to be intrinsically important 
for meeting welfare requirements, independently from the contribution they can make to 
economic growth.145  
 
The fact that the discourse after 1973 is being produced in the context of economic recession 
does not change the way that this aspect of social justice is conceived. Moreover, while the 
Common Market, and much of the work of the Community in the early years is primarily 
                                            
142 (Ortoli 1973, 3)  
143 (Jenkins 1977, 3) 
144 (Commission 1973c) Frequently recognising the needs, concerns and general importance of the human, seen 
as the common ‘status’ binding together the citizens of Europe (Ortoli 1973; Jenkins 1977, 3; Commission 
1973c) 
145 “the aims of the Community are as much social as economic, and the former cannot be regarded simply as a 
consequence of the latter, but should also be achieved as a result of action taken for social reasons……even if 
some of the rules…in the social field relate in the first place to economic needs and serve economic ends, they 
are unquestionably to be looked on now, within the framework of the Treaty, as principles and rules of social 
policy, and they must be implemented as such.” (Commission 1962, 5-6) 
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concerned with practical matters of an economic nature, this does not alter the fact that such 
matters are seen to be just the preliminary part of a much broader project aimed at ensuring a 
better future and quality of life for the citizens of Europe.146  
The discourse distinguishes between the objectives of the Community project, and the 
immediate or intermediate objectives that had to be achieved as part of the creation of the 
Common Market. 147  The preliminary nature of these economic objectives is frequently 
acknowledged.148 The sources suggest that the reason the discourse in the early part of the 
first period is dominated by concerns over economic growth is attributable to the extreme 
economic situation that states found themselves in during the early years of the EEC. It does 
not contradict the belief expressed in the discourse that economic policies are just part of 
achieving the much broader purposes of the Community.149   
 
Levi Sandri150 expressly counters the argument that, given the nature of the negotiations 
behind many of the social provisions in the Treaty, these provisions should be given an 
economic reading.151 He argues that these origins notwithstanding, they do not serve 
economic ends.152 This is so even if the ‘social aims’ of the EEC, clearly expressed in the 
Treaty, cannot “in number and in material significance stand comparison with those 
                                            
146See generally: (Levi-Sandri 1962b)  
147 (Pescatore and Dwyer 1974) uses similar terminology.  
148 The purportedly economic nature of the EEC is forcefully contradicted by a number of explicit statements in 
many of the sources: “the EEC is in no way a purely economic venture” … “even though the focus of much of 
the Community’s action [lies] in the economic sphere” (Hallstein 1966b) (Commission 1962, 5) (Levi-Sandri 
1962b, 5–6) (Hallstein 1966a, 21)  
149 (Commission 1966b, 8) For example, by the mid-1960s, with many of these preliminary objectives having 
been largely achieved “the road [was] sufficiently well marked out for the creative efforts of the institutions to 
be directed elsewhere” informed by “how we wish to live in this new economic area and what future we desire” 
Competition Policy is “not looked upon as an end in itself” but as “a suitable…and feasible means of achieving 
the objectives embodied in the treaties: (Groeben 1961a, 8)  
150 Levi Lionelli Sandri, Commissioner responsible for social affairs, 1960 – 1970.  
151 Art. 119 on equal pay resulted from France’s concerns that her commitment to this principle would put her at 
a competitive disadvantage: (Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001, 116–118) 
152 “It is widely held…that these provisions, even though they are described as ‘social’, serve what is to all 
intents and purposes a purely economic end, in keeping with certain principles enshrined in the Treaty, for 
example, to avoid so far as possible what are known as “distortion of competition” …It is pointed out (and this 
is undeniably true) that [Article 119] was written into the Treaty at the express request of France…anxious to 
guard against competition…more generally it could then be argued that all social provisions serve an economic 
end …I do not believe that the social provisions of the Treaties of Paris and of Rome can be viewed from such a 
narrow angle…” He devotes the rest of the speech to substantiating this argument.  (Levi-Sandri 1962b, 4–5) 
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concerning other sectors of Community activity…[such that] on the contrary, one might get 
the impression that these social provisions are merely something added to the Treaty of Rome 
– an after thought…” 153 
Instead, he stresses that “The Community’s action should pursue no other ends in respect of 
the clearly expressed social aims of the Treaty, on the strength of which the Community has 
most authoritatively been proclaimed to be a social community, on the grounds that it is 
beyond all question the social objectives which predominate.”154  
 
The different medium term economic policies emphasise that the “overall aim [of economic 
policy] is a rapid improvement in the standard of living of citizens”155 and it is the factors 
which are seen to be decisive in improving such standards that form the basis of the policy 
priorities, not just the pursuit of economic growth.156It is not seen to be acceptable to strive 
for growth at any cost, unless the process itself is acceptable:157growth is said to be ‘optimal’ 
only if it actually contributes to real development.158  
 
While the discourse sees social and economic policies as mutually reinforcing, it does not 
suggest that social policies are merely instrumental to meeting economic objectives. 159 
During the early part of the first period, generating growth was a pre-requisite for achieving 
social objectives, and social policy had to be used to complement this, because the basic 
needs of individuals could not yet be guaranteed within current economic means and without 
                                            
153 (Levi-Sandri 1962b, 3) 
154 (Levi-Sandri 1962b, 4) 
155 (Commission 1966a, I–2) (Commission 1971b, 9) 
156 i.e as if it was seen as the best way to meet welfare requirements. (Commission 1966a, III–2) 
157  “Economic Growth can be regarded as optimum growth only if at the same time, some degree of harmony is 
achieved in the relative development of different social groups, if the gap between the level of development in 
the various areas …of each member state is narrowed and if the gap between average standards of living 
throughout the Community is reduced” (Commission 1966a, I–2, I–3) 
158 (Commission 1966a, II–26) The same approach is evident after 1973: The discourse stresses that qualitative 
objectives cannot be compromised by quantitative economic targets and that meeting the needs of society must 
always be the prime consideration (Commission 1976c, 40) See also: (P. Hillery 1975) where it is stressed that 
the expenditure of the member states should be defined in light of real social need and (P. J. Hillery 1975c) 
where it is argued that economic growth is not simply an automatic catalyst for social progress and that as a 
result social policy cannot be a mere after-thought. 
159 (Commission 1971b) See also (Groeben 1961b) 
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some form of market system being in place.160It is clear that, as the Community develops, the 
matters over which the two models conflict emerge in the discourse, and it becomes clear that 
it is believed to be both legitimate, and necessary, for more important concerns to limit the 
pursuit of economic growth. This is evident in the discourse not just during the years of 
economic growth, but also in the context of the recession of the 1970s: 
 
In relation to competition policy, it is stated that: “if the objectives of the Treaty are to be 
attained, the competitive system cannot only benefit from but actually needs amplification or 
even some degree of rectification by means of common currency and economic policies, an 
active regional policy and measures of social policy.” … “with the ultimate goal of achieving 
justice”.161 It seems that the role of policies is seen to go beyond the correction of market 
failure. The idea of rectification appears to imply that the market must be made compatible 
with broader social goals. The pursuit of perfect competition is rejected because the structural 
transformations that market forces may give rise to may require some form of intervention by 
the state or the Community, otherwise “the social cost might not necessarily be 
acceptable.”162 Consequently, it is stated that the removal of barriers to effective competition 
“must be accompanied by back-up and promotional measures for industry as a whole and for 
certain sectors facing special problems.”163  
 
In a similar way, the discourse states that economic policy “cannot be limited to the twin 
objectives of growth and stability. Its real value depends on the contribution it makes to better 
living conditions; it must both raise the standards of living and improve the quality of life.” 
As a result, policy “must alleviate the cost of changes to individuals, in accordance with the 
                                            
160 “What is socially desirable may be limited, in practice, by what is economically possible, conversely social 
policy exerts an appreciable impact on economic activity…the interdependence of these two factors means that 
economic development and social progress must go hand in hand. If the guidelines are to be realistic, economic 
and social requirements must each be given their due.” (Commission 1966a, III–4) 
161 (Groeben 1961a, 6) 
162 (Vouel 1977a, 3) 
163 (Commission 1973a, 5) This must be contrasted with the discourse that emerges from 1979 where a very 
different approach is taken to ‘failing industries’ and the legitimacy of state aid. From 2010, state aid rules are 
applied strictly as they are seen to “squander the growth potential of the internal market” (Commission 2014a, 
7) See also:(Commission 2013c, 6) 
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principles of solidarity that are at the basis of all modern societies”164 while “expanding 
manpower should be used (as a policy strategy) [only] as far as social policy will allow.”165 
This perspective also underpins the way harmonisation is understood.  The discourse sees 
harmonisation not just in terms of preventing distortions of competition, but in restoring an 
overall balance in states’ economic and social development for their mutual benefit; ensuring 
each state can retain its identity, protecting states from the damaging impact of regulatory 
competition. 166 It is clear that the market is not seen to be an appropriate way to set social 
standards and the need for policy to maintain these standards is not subject to the requirement 
to ‘respect’ the dictates of the market. 167    
 
In the area of industrial policy, Spinelli168 forcefully argues that it is an “illusion that all 
growth is inherently beneficent…even the most beneficent growth tends to become 
pernicious and destructive in the long run.” He argues instead that primacy must be given to 
ecological needs and quality of life - in the workplace and elsewhere.169 It is believed that 
“Industrial development and the dynamism of the market must be made compatible with 
social and human requirements”170 and must “increasingly pursue qualitative objectives.”171 
“The natural concomitants of a European Industrial policy …[are] not only an increase in the 
quality of goods made available to consumers but also… a qualitative improvement in man’s 
living conditions.”172   
Once again, the discourse does not change with the onset of the recession in the 1970s: it 
emphasises that in the formulation of industrial policy, “‘social aspects’ must be watched 
constantly”…and “the necessary transformations” must be “organised under socially 
                                            
164 (Commission 1971b, 37) 
165 (Commission 1966a, III–5)  
166 (Commission 1973a, 11) 
 167 (Shanks 1977a, 380)  
168 Altiero Spinelli, Member of the European Commission with responsibility for Industrial Policy, 1970-1976.  
169 (Altiero Spinelli 1972b, 2) 
170 (Commission 1970, 6–7) 
171 (Commission 1970, 6–7) 
172 (Commission 1970, 7) 
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acceptable conditions.”173 It is stated that the pace of change may even need to be slowed 
down in order to better master its social consequences.174 In contrast to much of the post-
2000 discourse, there is less emphasis placed on the need for individuals to adapt to change 
and more on the need for policies to be adapted to make the process of change easier.175 
Consequently, “Necessary changes must be worked out with the workers rather than imposed 
upon them,”176 and “the development of new technologies [must] take account of aspirations 
for improved working conditions.”177 and costs equitably shared.178  
 
It is also clear that the discourse believes public expenditure should be used to achieve social 
objectives.179 This is a distinct contrast with the discourse in later periods:180 “Public 
expenditure [is] an important investment for the attainment of social objectives,”181… 
“private consumption might have to grow less rapidly than national product”, in order to 
permit a more rapid increase in community services (publicly provided) which the 
Commission sees as necessary to meet public needs and ensure fair distribution of goods and 
services.182 
 
                                            
173 (Altiero Spinelli 1972a, 15) 
174 (Commission 1978, 6; Davignon 1978). In respect of “recovery instruments” there is a  need  “to provide 
additional protection for those sections of society hardest hit by the crisis and to modify the use of such 
instruments(Commission 1975b, 8)”  
175 The discourse sees the Community role as rendering such changes both “economically possible and socially 
acceptable” (Commission 1978, 6) See also: (Vouel 1977b, 3) 
176 (Commission 1978, 18) 
177 (Commission 1978, 17) 
178 (Commission 1978, 16) 
179 See: (Commission 1978, 28)  
180 From 1979, the discourse frames public expenditure on social objectives as a cost and therefore counter-
productive, detracting from the economic growth seen to be the most important means for meeting welfare 
requirements. Eg: “the social security budget [must] not reduce the competitivity of industries of service 
sectors” and should be redirected towards promoting investment and cutting production costs. (Commission 
1981a, 3)     
181 (Commission 1971b, 37) 
182 (Commission 1971b, 6) See also: “It must be remembered that a permanently restrictive approach to public 
expenditure would hamper the effort being made to satisfy the growing needs of the community” (Commission 
1966a, III–3) 
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In the context of environmental policies, it is clear that growth can, and must, be sacrificed in 
the name of environmental preservation given its value to society and, unlike in the post-2010 
discourse this is so irrespective of its value as an economic resource.183 It expresses the belief 
that policies might legitimately impact negatively on growth while still ensuring that a 
maximum contribution is made to meeting welfare requirements.184 It expressly states that 
“any exploitation of natural resources…which causes significant damage to the ecological 
balance must be avoided” and “expansion” must be reconciled with the “increasing need to 
preserve the natural environment.”185 This is so even in the context of the recession. 
 
In other sources, the need to ensure “sufficiently controlled growth” is emphasised out of 
concern for protection of the physical, social and cultural environment.186 This is seen to 
require that the Community “change the order of precedence, to switch from the priority 
given to efficiency values to an increasingly insistent reference to other values such as 
responsibility towards other people of the present and future generations and towards their 
natural and social environment…”187 It contrasts significantly with how environmental 
concerns are conceived in later periods.  
 
It is clear that the discourse sees all policies as pursuing distinct, intrinsically important 
objectives that together contribute to meeting the requirements of welfare. This is seen to 
justify implementing policies even if the scale of economic growth and/or job creation might 
be reduced as a result. This is consistent with the Society Model conception. It is clear that 
                                            
183 “We shall have to pursue new objectives which are completely at variance with the wishes of the citizen of 
today, which restrict his freedom of consumption and production and which will make him realise that his 
present prosperity is in part only a false prosperity.”. (Mansholt 1972a) See industrial policy for the belief that 
growth is just one aspect of the much broader goal of social justice: (Commission 1973a, 15; Commission 1978, 
6,8,17,18; Davignon 1978) 
184 It is expressly stated that investment in public transport and environmental protection must be maintained in 
the recession: (Commission 1975b, 8) 
185 (Commission 1976a, 25) There is one more ambiguous statement: While “Community Environmental policy 
sets out to improve living conditions and protect our natural environment” a rider is added: “without creating 
barriers to trade and distortions of competition”  (Commission 1976d, 13)  
186 “Beyond a certain level of prosperity, economic growth should be controlled more strictly in line with quality 
requirements” (Carpentier 1972, 11) 
187 …“[the Community’s strength] should enable it to accept the changes which it will itself have to impose on 
its production and consumption systems, to meet the social aspirations of its people and the need to conserve the 
environment.” (Carpentier 1972, 6–7) 
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the discourse does not treat economic growth as if it is an overriding aim of all policy, 
because it is clear that it does not see the market as the best and only means to meet welfare 
requirements.  
HOW 
The Society Model conception of this aspect of social justice dominates the discourse.  
 
A Market Model conception would suggest that the Commission could not formulate policy 
on the basis of an objective idea of what welfare requires. The appropriate way to formulate 
policy would be seen to be assessing what the market, businesses and consumers ‘need’. It 
would see market failure and individual preference, revealed by direct consultation with 
economic actors, as important sources of the information necessary for policy making. This 
conception characterises the discourse from 1979 but is not consistent with the discourse of 
the early period.  
 
The discourse suggests that the “Community interest” is formulated objectively by the 
Commission. It expresses the belief that policy can meet welfare requirements if, informed by 
the Community’s own collection and analysis of data,188 it provides “a satisfactory answer to 
the problems posed by the social evolution of the society in which we are living”.189 
according to an objective idea of what is required.190  
 
The quantitative growth-related objectives set by the Community during the recession are not 
seen to override the whole range of social and economic objectives which have “a very 
important place in the thinking of those responsible for policy”191 and which underpin the 
objective content of policy.192Nor do they qualify the overriding need to “make…proposals 
                                            
188 Particularly after 1973, also by engaging with social partners and member states to determine the situation 
‘on the ground’.  
189 (Commission 1966b, 9) 
190 (Malfatti 1970b)(Commission 1971a; Commission 1971b) 
191 (Commission 1976c, 39)  
192 (Commission 1976c, 39) Similarly: (Commission 1973c)  
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reflect the community interest at all times.”193 The discourse recognizes citizens’  “entirely 
legitimate demands for a more just society and better quality of life”194 and emphasises that 
“there are problems in the social field common to all member states …which [can] be best 
dealt with at Community level…”195 This strongly suggests that it was believed that policy 
should primarily be based upon an objective view of what welfare requires. 
 
The discourse does not see the needs of business or of the market as the most important 
considerations for policy making. While in the mid-1970s, the sources indicate that, 
“providing the right [regulatory] environment for the individual firm” is seen to be important, 
it is clear that “each measure…has its own merit [and] also forms part of a mutually 
supportive whole.”196 While it is acknowledged that changes in the international economy 
have meant that “Openness towards the outside world is an irreversible fact of life…[and] 
implacably forces us to make our industries competitive on world markets”197 the need to 
help firms to become competitive is only one of the many considerations informing policy.198 
The idea of a ‘business-friendly’ regulatory environment, dominating the discourse in 
subsequent periods, is largely absent from the discourse at this time.199 The sources during 
both periods express a belief that objective requirements might legitimately override 
subjective preferences given the possibility that they might be formed in conditions in which 
individuals and states are incapable of understanding what welfare actually requires.200 
 
                                            
193 (Ortoli 1976) 
194 (Commission 1973c, 13) See also: (Shanks 1974, 2)  
195 (Commission 1973c, 13) 
196 (Commission 1978, 8) In a similar way, “everything should be done to ensure that this [public investment in 
infrastructure] makes the maximum contribution to improving the business climate" but at the same time, it is 
still seen to be important to maintain investment in public transport and environmental protection (Commission 
1975b, 8–9) 
197 (Vouel 1977a, 2) 
198 For example, see the balanced approach adopted in the sixth competition report “Neither the laissez-faire 
approach nor interventionism can as absolute principles offer a durable solution to the problems we are up 
against. The one would be found unacceptable: the other would lead to excessive conservatism” (Commission 
1977, 3) See also: “We should consider whether we need to do anything…to remove the competitive 
penalties…which social innovators may face in the common market…to remove such [competitive] penalties if 
they do exist” (Shanks 1974, 9) 
199 In the discourse after 1979 it is forcefully expressed that the “Miles and miles of European red-tape…[are] 
symptoms of the decadence of the welfare state” (F. Andriessen 1982, 1) 
200 As quoted above: (Mansholt 1972a) 
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This clearly suggests that the Society Model conception underpins the discourse: policy is 
formed from an objective conception of what collective welfare requires, one which cannot 
be over-ridden by individual preference.  
In the early years, it seems that the Commission does not supplement policy with information 
gathered by directly engaging with a broad range of social actors. The discourse rarely 
mentions social dialogue or consultation, and when doing so refers only to economic actors, 
seeing its importance primarily in terms of its contribution in the context of policy 
implementation rather than formation. 201  
 
The discourse does, however, state that “in every aspect of the construction of the 
Community…all European citizens must be able to participate.”202 Moreover, there are many 
examples that social dialogue is seen to be an important part of domestic employment 
regimes. While the Commission rarely supplements policy with information obtained through 
consultation,203in a number of speeches, the need for Community level labour organisations 
is stressed.204It is seen to be one way in which the involvement of European Citizens in 
building Europe can be achieved in the absence of an elected European Parliament.205 The 
discourse makes it clear that the objective was to inform the institutions of the “feelings, 
needs and aspirations of the great masses”206 represented by “all who have a role in social 
matters” to help the Community to orient policy towards enhancing collective welfare.207 It 
states that the Community “has always associated the representatives of industry with its 
                                            
201 (Levi-Sandri 1968) 
202.(Levi-Sandri 1968) 
203 The only role in relation to social dialogue that the Treaty provided for was a duty to promote close 
cooperation between member states as regards the right of association and collective bargaining.(1957, Art.118) 
204 (Levi-Sandri 1968; Levi Sandri 1964; Levi-Sandri 1965) 
205 (Levi Sandri 1964, 2) “In the meantime we must use other means and systems to infuse an increasing 
measure of effective democracy into Community life”… “Europe must be a true human Community made by 
man for man” See also: (Levi-Sandri 1968) 
206 (Levi Sandri 1964, 3) 
207 It is stated that the ultimate purpose would be to ensure that policy could “lead to the progressive levelling up 
of living standards”.(Levi Sandri 1964, 4–5): “All present day development must be directed towards the 
individual, who should enjoy, thanks to such development, improved possibilities for advancement which will 
help him in his turn to contribute in greater measures to the wellbeing of society” (Levi Sandri 1964, 2) 
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work on social matters”208 – and it appears this is not just in respect of ensuring Community 
policies are implemented effectively. It indicates that Community level industrial 
organisations, should be just the first step in creating “a true human Community made by 
man for man”209 in which “all European citizens must be able to participate”.210  
 
After 1973, the discourse is even clearer in its articulation of the belief that consultation with 
social partners is an additional but crucial basis upon which to formulate policy.211 However, 
the Heads of Government at the Paris Summit had stated specifically that the Social Action 
Programme should take steps to agree collective agreements at European level, and increase 
the involvement of labour in management - perhaps explaining why progress is made in this 
area after 1973 but not before, and the sources referring to it more numerous.212   
 
This post-1973 discourse clearly sees consultation as a means to reconcile competing 
interests and ensure that policy is as informed as possible about the social and economic 
problems that have to be addressed.213 It is also seen to be a crucial pre-requisite to expecting 
society’s co-operation with some of the difficult changes involved in recovery: to ensure the 
process adopted can be in the interest of all the peoples of Europe.214  The discourse 
emphasises the need to reach a ‘social consensus’ between public authorities and social 
partners, not just over “the objectives of full employment, growth and stability. The general 
objectives of qualitative and social progress must also be included.”215 
 
                                            
208 (Levi-Sandri 1965) 
209 (Levi Sandri 1964, 2) 
210 (Levi-Sandri 1968) 
211 “Firms should carry on and should be required to discuss properly with…the appropriate social partners 
institutions and report on their social achievements, social prospects and perhaps their plans in the social area 
for the years ahead”(Shanks 1974, 12) . 
212  (Council 1972, 19 – 21)  
213 “All those concerned [with the present difficulties] will have to pursue a genuine policy of ensuring the 
fullest possible mutual information and consultation” such that “In this context, cooperation between unions, 
employers and authorities…takes on an important function.”(Commission 1975b, 6) 
214 (P. J. Hillery 1975b, 1) To be contrasted with the discourse post-2010 where participation is to ensure 
effective implementation of a pre-decided recovery strategy: "Reform requires a major effort from all parts of 
society" because "change is necessary" (Barroso 2011, 8) 
215 (Commission 1976c, 41) See also: (P. J. Hillery 1975a)(Shanks 1974, 12)  
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The discourse relates the need for consultation to the belief that the Community cannot 
determine independently the full extent of what is necessary to meet the needs of each 
society.216 The discourse stresses “the need to work together” particularly given that those 
hardest hit by the recession “have no organized representation of their own”.217 It is in this 
context that the discourse expresses the belief that co-operation between Member States 
should be facilitated by Community level policies, with consultation, participation and 
democratisation seen to be particularly important for this purpose.218   
 
It is clear that the discourse believes that the standard to be achieved through policy is 
objective, but consultation and co-operation is seen to be crucial from 1958-1979 if policy is 
to be appropriately tailored to address the specific problems necessary to achieve it - despite 
the fact that particularly before 1973 the mechanisms for such consultation are not yet 
established. While consultation and participation most often refers to the role to be played by 
industrial representatives, it is clear that the matters to be addressed are all those likely to 
impact on the collective welfare of Europeans generally. This strongly supports the view that 
the Society Model conception of this aspect of social justice dominates the discourse during 
this period.  
 
WHO 
The Society Model conception of this aspect of social justice dominates the discourse from 
1958 - 1979. The discourse does not draw on efficiency arguments alone in assessing the 
appropriate division of competence. It assumes that the Member States should continue to 
intervene in their national economies through a mixture of economic and social policy, 
expressing a belief that Member States are better able to protect the social values of particular 
                                            
216 “If the European Community is to acquire a ‘human face’ it must expose itself to the maximum consultation 
with the people and the institutions for whom it is legislating. If it is to develop a social programme which 
responds to the needs and priorities of the people of Europe, it must discuss with them what their needs are, and 
how they can best be fulfilled. If it is to enlist the support of the social partners in the fight against 
unemployment and inflation, it must be prepared to examine appropriate strategies with them. A non-
participative social policy is a contradiction in terms” (Shanks 1977a, 381)  
217 (Haferkamp 1975) 
218 (Ortoli 1973, 26) 
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importance to their own citizens.219 It takes a nuanced approach in which a careful balance is 
sought between this and the need for common action in a Community in which states’ 
economies and societies are becoming increasingly interdependent:  
 
“There are differences in priority in defining the components of social progress and growth as 
well as the choice of instruments” particularly in the more ‘qualitative areas’ of policy. 
Consequently “One should not seek uniformity in this area, [but] certain conditions for 
convergence in the Community should nevertheless be fulfilled.”220 The Community’s role is 
to provide “the resources that will…be devoted by Member States to the promotion of 
different activities” and empower states to pursue policies that are better attuned to the needs 
of their societies.221  This is to be contrasted with the belief that states should design policy in 
light of Community objectives alone in the post-2010 period.222   
 
The discourse rejects the view that regulation of the market, particularly at state level, 
prevents it from operating optimally. It sees state regulation of the market as a pre-condition 
for its creation. It suggests that states must be allowed to mediate between the market and its 
impact on society.  
 
The Community is understood to be: “an economic order based on freedom [but one which] 
can only exist in the world today at the price of constant state intervention in economic 
life.”223 The system of free competition in the common market is not understood to be the 
sole means for meeting the treaty objectives.  Free competition at this level is understood 
                                            
219 This is also inherent in the Treaty:  (Giubboni, Gormley, and Shaw 2006) (Lenaerts 1993, 852–855) 
220 (Commission 1976c, 40) See also: the task of the Community in the social field is not to equalise but to 
establish minimum standards, below which nobody should be allowed to fall, but on the basis of which those 
who can afford to do so should build their own more ambitious systems. Thus nobody’s social advance should 
be held back by Community measures; but the weakest should be helped to advance further than they otherwise 
could” (Shanks 1974, 380)  
221 (Commission 1978, 7)(P. J. Hillery 1975c) “The Commission has never proposed the transfer to Community 
level of those responsibilities and functions carried out more appropriately at other levels. However, there are 
some problems which must be dealt with on the widest possible basis and the number of these grows with the 
increasing inter-dependence of our economie.” See also the commitment to “the pursuit at national level of 
policies suited to individual characteristics and problems of each country:(Commission 1974, 3) 
222 "We need…the Commission to propose and assess the actions that member states should take - 
governments…cannot do this by themselves" (Barroso 2011, 2)  
223 (Commission 1962, 5) 
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simply to be underpinning, and underpinned by, domestic policy:224 “welfare conditions the 
policy and economy of every modern state… and is given particular importance by the 
Community”225which intends to enable states to fund the social policies that best accord with 
their national values.226   
 
As a result, harmonisation is seen to be particularly necessary during the 1970s, to prevent 
states yielding to the pressure to drive down social standards in an attempt to stimulate 
economic recovery.227 Harmonisation is not conceived as a replacement for state policy 
autonomy, but seen to supplement it when the interdependence between them might lead to it 
being compromised. The discourse stresses that at all times the Community will ensure that 
each state/system retains its identity and capacity to tailor policy to individual 
particularities.228  
The Community role is seen to be to co-ordinate the policies of states to ensure they can be 
pursued in harmony.229 The discourse suggests that the Community’s role is seen to lie in 
identifying areas of interdependence and enabling Member States to co-ordinate their 
policies, by acting as “a valuable clearing house for ideas” and issuing “recommendations, 
promoting and co-ordinating230 research and organizing pilot projects.”231 with common 
                                            
224 (Commission 1962, 5) 
225 (Levi-Sandri 1962b, 2) The discourse expressly rejects the view that the Community should restrict state 
intervention in the overriding interest of free competition: (Groeben 1961b) The discourse expresses the view 
that “[The modern State] lays down essential conditions for the economic activities of its citizens…through 
what we call ‘policy’” (Hallstein 1962) 
226 (Commission 1971b) 
227 Common action is necessary to: “ensure that the measures taken to remedy external payment difficulties do 
not…jeopardise our efforts to achieve social justice” (Commission 1974, 4)  See also discourse in: (Commission 
1974, 5)  (Shanks 1977b, 380)  
228 (Commission 1973a, 11)   
229 The “essential aim of Community action is to preserve and enrich the fertile pluralism of our society…it is 
and will continue to be based on free enterprise, on agreements…between workers and employers’ organisations 
and on programmes carried out by regional and national public authorities…nevertheless, it is essential that joint 
action be decided upon within the Community institutions to ensure that…all member states receive the 
maximum advantages that membership can bring for their economic and social development.”  (Commission 
1973a, 5–6) 
230 See also:(Commission 1973b, 12)  
231 (P. J. Hillery 1975c) In regional policy also it is stated that “Community Regional Policy cannot be a 
substitute for the national regional policies of the member states…it must complement them with the aim of 
reducing the main disparities across the Community…for this reason the effectiveness of the Community’s 
policy will also depend on the close co-operation of the Member States” (Commission 1973b, 12) 
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policies becoming progressively more necessary as the increasing interdependence of states’ 
economies becomes clear.232  
 
In contrast to the Market Model conception, the discourse does not express the belief that the 
market can bring about the correct standards, nor does it limit harmonisation to clearly 
identifiable cases of market failure. Economic efficiency is merely one of a number of 
considerations in assessing how competence should be divided. The discourse clearly 
suggests that the Society Model conception of social justice dominates all aspects of social 
justice from 1958 to 1979.  
  
                                            
232 (P. J. Hillery 1975c) Political background factors may also have been influential: attempts to foster co-
operation were proving particularly difficult in the 1960s, given the growing frustration over the legislative 
deadlock in the Council (Rey 1968)  
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2010 - 2015233 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The discourse during this period is produced in a fundamentally different economic and 
political context to that of the previous periods, but is similar to the post-1973 discourse in 
that the policy-agenda is dominated by the prevailing economic 'crisis'.234 The Europe 2020 
Strategy,235 instigated as the Lisbon Strategy’s successor, doubles as the EU’s exit-strategy 
from the crisis in the Eurozone,236which it conceives to be a symptom of all the economic, 
social and political problems facing the EU.237 
 
The new strategy coincides with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,238 and the 
transformation and strengthening of the framework of economic governance at EU level, 
prompted by the crisis.239  
 
Consequently, the discourse is being produced in a fundamentally different legal and 
institutional environment at this time, affecting the legal frame through which policies are 
                                            
233 Where discourse from the period between 1979 and 2010 is referred to in this section, the sources relied upon 
are those referred to in Annex 1.  
234 For the Key dates see: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1795026/euro-zone-debt-
crisis/301861/Timeline-of-key-events-in-the-European-sovereign-debt-crisis 
235 Europe 2020 is guided by a series of headline targets and priorities related to employment policy, poverty 
reduction, research and development and climate change, all aimed at raising Europe’s competitiveness. It 
introduces new mechanisms for economic policy co-ordination, increased monitoring of national budgets and 
fiscal consolidation, as part of strengthening the overall framework of economic governance in response to the 
crisis: This includes ex ante review of state budgets against priorities set by the EU, reporting and evaluation 
duties, competitiveness scoreboards and a mechanism through which country-specific recommendations and 
targets can be set.  
236 (Commission 2010b, 2–3) For details, see:  (Copeland and James 2014, 1)   
237 (Commission 2010b, 2) 
238 1 December 2009. 
239   This substantially restricts the policy autonomy of the member states in respect of large areas of economic 
and social policy. (Adams and Deakin 2015, 114) For an overview of the changes in the economic governance 
framework, see: (Degryse 2012) 
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conceived and affecting the balance of power between the different institutions and their 
influence on the discourse. 
THE EU'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE TODAY 
One of the distinguishing features of the discourse produced during this period is that it draws 
on a number of discursive frames in an apparent attempt to legitimise the policies being 
pursued. It appears that it is drawing on both legal legitimacy, referring to concepts and 
duties embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon240 and social legitimacy, framing the discourse by 
reference to concepts and ideas that it believes to be consistent with states’ and citizens' 
conceptions of social justice. 
 
It is possible that the new way in which policy ideas are being articulated is an implicit 
recognition by the EU that  the objectives it is pursuing, and the means being employed, may 
not be consistent with what citizens believe it should be trying to achieve. This seems to be 
being interpreted as implying that policies need to be re-framed rather than re-formulated, as 
a means to improve perceptions of legitimacy. It may also be the case that the EU is 
acknowledging the importance of the background to, and changes introduced, in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The discourse may be attempting to appeal to the Member States to illustrate that 
there is a legal and democratic basis for the policies being adopted, and therefore a 
justification for acting collectively. 
 
The discourse does not suggest that the changed legal context or citizens' attitudes towards 
the EU, have prompted a reorientation in the way that social justice is conceived. However, it 
provides a particularly  interesting contrast with the discourse produced between 1958 and 
1979 because many of the concepts employed during the earlier period are used in the post-
2010 discourse, but in ways that demonstrate a very different understanding behind them. It is 
clear that the EU is no longer aiming to create the same type of society that it believed it 
should be creating during the first twenty years of its existence. This section will attempt to 
highlight some of the more significant changes that can be identified in the discourse.  
WELFARE 
                                            
240 and the Europe 2020 strategy, which the European governments have endorsed. 
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Consistently with the discourse from 1979, the EU no longer believes in an objective state of 
well-being above and beyond individual preference satisfaction. It no longer believes there 
are many spheres of life which contribute to welfare, and therefore conceives of policy 
problems, subjects, and solutions, in terms of their relationship with the market. ("Scope" and 
"Quality") Its conception of the "Focus" and "Distribution" dimensions have been 
fundamentally transformed, with significant consequences for the way in which a number of 
policy areas are now conceived. For this reason, this section will focus primarily on these 
latter two dimensions of welfare.  
 
The overriding argument the discourse presents is that only if states accept the need for EU 
level policy-making, and therefore act collectively, will the values of all European societies, 
and the European Social Model (ESM) which they all share, be upheld: "The only way we 
will get the scale and efficiency we need to be a global player…to safeguard our values…in a 
changing world” is to follow the policy prescriptions – whatever their content – mandated at 
EU level, the policies designed to “stabilise the EMU, boost sustainable growth and restore 
competitiveness.”241  
 
Fundamental changes to the way that states conduct their social policies are therefore framed 
as being required to 'preserve' the EU's values and social model,242 but the discourse makes 
no attempt to give substance to what the ‘ESM’ actually is, or what these values actually 
mean. 243  It merely makes it clear that they depend on growth and jobs for sustainability, 
development and maintenance.244 This argument is used to justify extensive structural 
reforms,245 and the ‘modernisation’ of labour law and social protection systems.246 The 
                                            
241 (Barroso 2012, 3–4) The specific ‘European values,’ and the concept itself, are invoked in the majority of the 
sources either to reassure states and citizens that policies respect these values, derive from them or are 
necessary to preserve them for the future.  
242 (Barroso 2011; European Commission 2012; Barroso 2012; Commission 2013b)   
243 “Reforms to our labour markets, public finances and pensions require a major effort from all parts of society. 
We know these changes are necessary so we can…keep our social model” (Barroso 2011, 8) “Determined fiscal 
consolidation is a means to an end: it is essential for restoring macro-financial stability as a basis for growth and 
securing the future of the European Social Model” where what this is goes unelaborated. (Commission 2011b, 
2)  See also:(Commission 2010b, 26) 
244 “Only by restoring growth and confidence will we develop the EU’s unique social model”… “Preserving our 
social model involves strengthening the internal market...”(Commission 2011b, 2) 
245 “To support the EU’s economic growth potential and the sustainability of our social model, the consolidation 
of public finances in the context of the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) involves setting priorities and making 
hard choices” (Commission 2010b, 26)” 
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discourse makes it clear that ‘modern’ social protection systems are those that help to 
maximise growth by requiring lower levels of public expenditure: making sure that ‘work 
pays’, through active labour market policies247 creating incentives to work,248 and 
minimum249 safety-nets confined to ‘the most vulnerable’ in society250 i.e those who cannot 
participate in the market:251 the old, the young and the disabled.252This reinforces the way 
that the new role for public policies is conceived: as justified only if any cost involved will 
lead to long-term economic gain. It is this that underpins the belief that state expenditure on 
life-long education and social services– ‘social investment’ - is necessary. It derives from the 
need to maximise labour market participation253 and thereby maximise growth in the 
economy as a whole.254 Gone is the belief that manpower policy should be used only insofar 
as social policy will allow. 255 
                                                                                                                                        
246 “Action under this head will require modernizing our employment, education and training 
policies…”(Commission 2010b, 17)  “Ultimately, reforming and modernizing our economies is needed to 
underpin our European Social Model”(Commission 2014c, 5) This leads to the argument that “Employment 
protection rules and institutions should provide a suitable environment to stimulate investment while offering 
modern levels of protection” (Commission 2014c, 10) 
247 “The modernization of social policies entails giving activation measures a more prominent role” 
(Commission 2013b, 2) 
248 “Unemployment benefits should be reviewed to ensure that they provide incentives to work, avoid benefit 
dependency and support adaptability to the business cycle. Member States should design benefits to reward 
return to work…through time-limited support, and conditionality linking training and job search more closely to 
benefits. Member States need to ensure work pays through greater coherence between the level of income 
taxes…and unemployment benefits.” (Commission 2010e, 6) 
249 Social protection should be simplified and better targeted, “Ensuring that those most in need receive adequate 
support while reducing the burden on public finances” (Commission 2013b, 8) 
250 For example: (Commission 2011a, 12) stressing the need for adequate and affordable social services to 
prevent the marginalization of vulnerable groups, within an overall context of determined fiscal consolidation. 
Similarly only ‘essential’ or ‘basic’ social safety nets are seen to be required: “we need to remember the needs 
of the aging and the most vulnerable in society”. (Barroso 2009, 15) Poverty is frequently reduced to the most 
extreme concept of deprivation, with the need to “supply food for the most deprived persons”  the main means 
to combat it. (Barroso 2011, 8)  
251 (Commission 2011a, 12) 
252 (Thyssen 2014)  
 
253 To protect the vulnerable it is seen to be necessary to “[Ensure] access to services supporting integration in 
the labour market” (Commission 2011a, 12) 
254 “Meeting the poverty target “would  not only improve their lives but also bring economic benefits for the 
society as a whole. (European Commission 2012, 11)” “Society as a whole bears the social and economic costs 
of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion” (Commission 2013b, 2) See also: (Commission 2013b, 3) 
(Commission 2013b; Barroso 2011; Commission 2010a; Commission 2010e; Commission 2011a; European 
Commission 2012; Commission 2013b)  
255 (Commission 1966a, III–5)  
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The discourse frames this policy orientation as if it empowers individuals to take advantage 
of the opportunities deriving from market participation.256This also underpins the way that 
the role for the state in helping to meet welfare requirements is conceived. The role is now 
almost entirely passive257consisting in preserving the free exercise of individual rights258 
ensuring these rights are enforced,259 respected260 and/or recognised261while guaranteeing 
conditions for personal and physical security.262 This discourse continues the discourse from 
the 1993-2010 period by equating individual rights with welfare because they are seen to be 
the best way to maximize input into the market, increasing competitiveness and growth. This 
rights-based discourse should be contrasted with the language of welfare and well-being 
employed between 1958 and 1979. It illustrates that equal opportunities in the market is the 
limit of what it is believed that welfare requires of policy-makers.  
The discourse uses the concept of 'social cohesion’ in a similarly instrumental way. 263 From 
1985, social cohesion achieved via limited redistributive measures is seen to be necessary for 
the purposes of maximizing aggregate growth. In the post-2010 period it is framed as both the 
product of  and pre-requisite to growth, created by a high-employment economy. 264 
However, a high-employment economy is only possible when labour market participation is 
                                            
256 (Commission 2013b; Thyssen 2014; Andor 2014a; Commission 2012b; Commission 2010a; Barroso 2009; 
Commission 2013b; Commission 2010g) 
257 At the EU level, removing obstacles to the exercise of individual rights is seen to require guaranteeing their 
enforcement by ensuring Directives are implemented; making their exercise simpler through reducing costs and 
administrative burdens; and increasing awareness of rights information campaigns: (Commission 2010f, 23) 
258 (Barroso 2011) 
259 (Commission 2010f, 21–22) 
260 (Barroso 2010, 7) 
261 Many documents advocate a ‘rights based approach’ : eg. (Commission 2014b, 10) 
262 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is seen to cover all the matters that are relevant for this purpose.  
“Everything we do is for the citizens of Europe…fundamental rights exist wherever they go. Everyone in 
Europe must respect the law and the government must respect human rights, including those of minorities. …” 
“An area of freedom, liberty and security will create a place where Europeans can prosper” (Barroso 2010, 7) 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. For an overview, see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.1.html [Accessed 29th May 
2015]  
263 During this period, social cohesion is both an express Treaty objective, and a core part of the Europe 2020 
strategy. (2007 Art.2(3) TEU) 
 
264 (Commission 2010b, 5) 
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maximized.265This means that social cohesion does not have an autonomous meaning in the 
discourse. It reflects the ‘ideal’ of a high employment economy delivering maximum growth 
through increased competitiveness.266 Policies are framed as if they are aimed at achieving 
social cohesion, when in fact the new argument is that maximum growth and competitiveness 
are themselves sufficient for social cohesion to be 'achieved’. This means that there can be no 
justification for state policies to mediate between the market's operation and its impact on 
society, because expenditure on policies is framed as if it is no longer required.  
 
The market itself is seen to create social cohesion. It is no longer seen to be a value that states 
must protect by restricting the measures that can be used to maximise growth. Irrespective of 
the immediate social consequences, fiscal consolidation and structural adjustment are not 
seen to conflict with the objective of ‘achieving’ social cohesion: they are believed to be the 
pre-requisite for the greater competitiveness upon which ‘inclusive’ growth – the socially 
cohesive high-employment economy – depends.267 This makes the belief that “fiscal 
consolidation will have to go hand in hand with important structural reforms in particular of 
pensions, health care social protection and employment systems” appear to be in the interests 
of maintaining cohesion.268  
 
This is just one of the ways in which the discourse indicates the prevailing conception of the 
"Focus" dimension of welfare. It does not mark a qualitative shift from the way that the 
discourse has been developing since 1979, but for the first time draws on language associated 
with the Society Model conception as the frame through which it is articulated. 269  Whereas 
in previous periods, the discourse rejects the need for the state to protect social cohesion 
except to the extent necessary to maximize growth, in this period, it sees this as synonymous 
with promoting competitiveness, and implementing the vigorous fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms required by the market. The changes made to the legal environment by 
                                            
265 (Commission 2010b, 17) A properly operating single market is seen to be a source of economic growth and 
social cohesion.(Barroso 2009, 28)  
266 (Barroso 2010, 5) 
267 “Sound public finances are a means to an end: growth for jobs. Our goal is growth, sustainable growth, 
inclusive growth” (Barroso 2010) 
268 (Commission 2010b, 27) 
269 And language in Art.3(3) TEU 
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virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the growing discontent felt by citizens, does not appear to 
have changed the way that this aspect of social justice is understood but has simply changed 
the way that the discourse is being framed. 
 
The difference between this discourse and the discourse produced during the recession in the 
early 1970s could not be clearer.270 Social cohesion is seen to derive from ensuring states 
tailor policies to the dictates of the market rather than preventing the market from dismantling 
the social fabric of society.271 
 
The discourse during this period, as was also the case between 1958 and 1979,272 attributes 
particular importance to the special role that “services of general interest” play in the Member 
States.273 It adopts a flexible approach to determining when restrictions on competition may 
be justified, so states retain some control over service delivery. 274 Nonetheless, it does not 
reflect a qualitative shift from how these services have been conceived since 1979.  
 
In the 1979 period, the legitimacy of giving a privileged position to public undertakings and 
public service providers is seen to depend on whether doing so is an economically efficient 
way to address a clearly demonstrable market failure.275 Public services are said to be 
                                            
270 "Industrial development and the dynamism of the market must be made compatible with social and human 
requirements" (Commission 1970, 6–7) 
271 That the priority is to tailor policies to the market is evident in a number of sources:  “We have the people, 
we have the companies. What they both need is an open and modern single market” (Barroso 2010, 5) “To 
support the EU’s economic growth potential and the sustainability of our social models, the consolidation of 
public finances in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact involves setting priorities and making hard 
choices” (Commission 2010b, 26) “Budgetary consolidation programmes should prioritise growth enhancing 
items” (Commission 2010b, 26) The discourse continues to see state intervention in the market as justified only 
to enhance the market’s growth potential, or in the presence of market failure (Commission 2013c, 6) 
272 In the discourse on public services. 
273 This approach appears to have been gradually emerging in the discourse from the mid-2000s.  
274 (2007, Art.14, Art.106 TFEU) This covers so-called “Services of General Economic Interest” and “Social 
Services of General Interest.” 
275 For example, Andriessen is “not in favour” of “far-reaching government involvement in the economy” 
because “I have yet to come across a single instance of a country in which government has successfully 
managed to perform the role of entrepreneur”. (F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1984b, 9) It is stated that a dirigiste 
industrial policy would “be more likely to reflect political bargaining process or so-called fairness between 
nations than hard industrial reality”(Tugendhat 1984, 4). Fair competition is seen to require ensuring “state 
undertakings in the public sector…are operating on an equal footing with their competitors in the private 
sector… providing this does not prejudice the carrying out  of services in the general interest” (Commission 
1980, 10)“The Directive (on State aid) is designed to preserve the principle of Equality of Opportunity for 
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‘special,’ solely by reason of the fact that they are services to which universal access is 
required.276 The ultimate question is seen to be whether the normal rules of competition can 
operate in respect of the undertaking in question if left to market forces. State aid is 
understood in a similar way: “The Commission is …always prepared to take a favourable 
view of aid [in areas] which are of considerable importance to the Community’s economic 
development and the employment level” while aid for non-economic reasons is not seen to be 
legitimate.277 This contrasts considerably with the approach taken in the early 1970s.278 
 
The main distinguishing feature of the post-2010 period is that preserving the public 
character of social service provision is expressly recognized to be important for economic 
reasons: to secure universal access and guarantee a specific standard of provision. 
Restrictions are still legitimate only if it is clear that the market would not ensure this 
standard of delivery by itself.279 The only real change is that investing in social services is 
seen to bring economic returns for states by increasing labour market participation, and is no 
longer conceived as constituting an illegitimate cost.  
 
While there has been significant development over time in the precise policy-approach taken 
to public services, the very fact that the constant factor has been that states must justify any 
intervention into the market involved in the organization of such services demonstrates that, 
in contrast with the discourse between 1958 and 1979, there is no assumption that the state is 
                                                                                                                                        
competing private and public sector companies…” and in doing so “[cannot] be interpreted as a failure...to 
recognize the special role of public undertakings can play in the Community’s economic system” (Commission 
1981b, 10) 
276 (Commission 1980, 10)  
277 “National aids must be assessed against broader economic objectives”(F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1981, 6) “The 
essential role of public authorities at all levels…is to ensure that the economic, social, fiscal and legal 
framework within which enterprise operate encourages them to adapt to market opportunities in a positive 
manner. The limited resources available to public authorities should be used primarily to support the efforts of 
the dynamic enterprise and not to provide artificial support for state of declining enterprises” (Davignon 1979, 
8) “My philosophy starts from the principle of free competition between firms”… “State aids must be assessed 
against general economic objectives” While these may give way to some ‘higher objectives’ the only such 
objectives recognised have economic justifications, with the exception only of trade and industries in difficulty, 
an exception which is expressly stated to be very limited. (F. H. J. J. Andriessen 1984b, 12–13)”  
278 “…human and social factors involved…may justify aid which might go beyond what is required by strictly 
economic reasoning” (European Commission 1972, 18) 
279 ‘Public service obligations cannot be imposed if [the service] can be provided under normal market 
conditions” (Commission 2013a, 9)(Commission 2013c, 5)  
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best placed to defend the public interest.280 Since 1979, it has remained the case that the state 
must prove itself to be more efficient than the market if any intervention is to be legitimate.  
 
In the post-2010 period, it is clear that social services are seen to make an important 
contribution to growth, which is the reason why some intervention in the market can be 
justified at all. However, this consideration has to be balanced with the intrinsic importance 
attributed to protecting individual choice, and economic freedom.281 In line with the Market 
Model, the discourse expresses the belief that the state should not intervene to protect social 
values that conflict with ‘market’ aims. There is no room in this understanding for ideas of 
collective welfare, and it is implicit that the primary concern is the protection of the 
individual’s rights. 282  The discourse severs the welfare of the individual from the welfare of 
the whole because, consistent with the discourse from 1979 onwards, it has no conception of 
individual embeddedness: it does not see collective welfare as the fundamental foundation 
upon which individual welfare is built.  
While social services are now exempt from a number of the state aid rules,283the discourse 
distinguishes between economic and non-economic services by reference to whether the 
service is based on ‘solidarity’: if membership in the scheme of distribution is compulsory, 
and there is redistribution within the system. 284 It therefore sees ‘solidarity’ as a limitation on 
individual freedom, rather than as a voluntary expression of community membership and 
identity, based on risk sharing and belonging. 285   
 
                                            
280 Where an "economic order based on freedom...can only exist...at the price of constant state intervention in 
economic life" because "welfare conditions the policy and economy of every modern state...and is given 
particular importance by the Community" (Commission 1962, 5)(Levi-Sandri 1962b, 2) 
281 For example, social services are seen to make a contribution to job generation and social cohesion, poverty 
reduction and the EU 2020 targets. (Commission 2010c, 6)  
282 See a similar perspective in: (Hervey 2000, 47) 
283 “services meeting social needs” are exempted from the duty to notify the Commission of state aid. However, 
State aid rules apply to the financing of social services of an economic nature.  (Commission 2012a)    
284 This discourse endorses the approach of the Court (Commission 2013a, 9) 
285 For an interesting overview of these two possible interpretations of solidarity, see: (Davies 2010) See also: 
(Hervey 2000) Contrast with the discourse in the first period: Policy "must alleviate the cost of changes to 
individuals, in accordance with the principles of solidarity that are at the basis of all modern societies" 
(Commission 1973c, 37) 
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There is no longer any evidence of a competing Society Model conception of the "Focus" 
dimension in the discourse. Instead, the concepts common to such a conception have been 
appropriated as the frames through which the Market Model conception is articulated, either 
by virtue of their inclusion in the Treaty of Lisbon, or as a conscious attempt to legitimize the 
policy approach.  
 
Welfare requirements are believed to be met as a result of the opportunities provided by the 
market, and as a result the discourse clearly expresses the belief that labour market 
participation is sufficient to solve problems of social exclusion, poverty and a lack of 
cohesion.286 ‘Social exclusion’ is indistinguishable from poverty, both of which being framed 
as economic problems,287 understood in terms of a predominantly materialistic conception of 
deprivation.288 The discourse often equates ‘social participation’ with ‘labour market 
participation’, and ‘empowerment with the ability to exercise rights in the market.289  
Environmental protection is important because resource-efficiency facilitates growth and job 
creation while social services and education are important because they increase 
employability.290 
 
The discourse clearly illustrates the way in which the state's role in relation to welfare has 
been reconceptualised. One way in which it does this is through the use of the concept of 
‘sustainability’ which, unlike in the 1958-1979 period, is now equated with resource 
efficiency:291 the cost-effective use of both environmental and economic resources.  
                                            
286 “Jobs are essential to escape from poverty and contribute to equality, equity, justice, peace and security. The 
creation of decent jobs, particularly from a long-term development perspective, strengthens 
growth”(Commission 2014b, 8) 
287 “Poverty in its multiple dimensions includes a lack of income and sufficient material resources to live in 
dignity; inadequate access to basic services, such as healthcare, housing and education; labor market exclusion 
and poor quality work. These elements are the root causes of poverty and explain how individuals and families 
become socially excluded” (Commission 2010g, 7) 
288The Poverty target (to lift 20 million people out of the ‘at risk of poverty and social exclusion’ category) 
allows for three alternative definitions of poverty: by reference to a relative income poverty threshold; a material 
deprivation threshold and a ‘jobless’ household threshold.  
289 Ensuring that “people experiencing poverty and social exclusion are enabled to live in dignity and take an 
active part in society” is seen to be achieved by meeting the “employment and education targets” (Commission 
2010g, 4) 
290 (Commission 2011a, 11; Commission 2012b, 11; Commission 2010e, 15; Commission 2014c, 11) 
291 (Commission 2010a, 6) 
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The overriding importance of ensuring ‘sustainable’ resource use is seen to derive from the 
need to “decouple growth from resource use [to] give Europe a competitive advantage”.292 
The importance of environmental policies is seen to lie in the economic potential of the 
‘green economy,’293 emphasising the need for “Turning the challenge of a sustainable Europe 
to our competitive advantage…to show how fighting climate change can help to modernise 
our economies.”294 The need to “invest in more sustainability” is not just about “doing the 
right thing for the future of the planet. Europe stands to benefit enormously from investing in 
low carbon technologies for future jobs and growth.”295 
Imposing strict constraints on public spending, pursuing fiscal consolidation and 
implementing structural reforms is seen to render growth sustainable.296 The “unravelling of 
the social safety net” is ‘caused’ by unsustainable social spending because “money spent on 
servicing debt cannot be spent on the social good.”297 It is because growth and jobs are seen 
to be the sources of this ‘social good’ that the strategy of further reductions in spending, 
further structural reforms and sound public finances298 is seen to be the most effective means 
to meet welfare requirements.299 Sustainable growth therefore requires cuts in social 
                                            
292(Commission 2010d, 5) See also: “We should aim to decouple growth from energy use and become a more 
resource efficient economy, which will not only give Europe a competitive advantage but also reduce its 
dependency on foreign resources (Commission 2010b, 15)  
293 “Renewable energies are not just the sinew of ecological do-gooders…[they are] a sine qua non if 
tomorrow’s Europe really is going to create lasting, consistent and sustainable locational advantages which are 
directly comparable with those of other world players “ (Juncker 2014b, 17) 
294 (Barroso 2009, 15) 
295 …“Without structural reforms, we will not create sustainable growth…now is the time to modernise our 
social market economy so it can compete globally.”. (Barroso 2009, 21) See also: “Restoring sustainable growth 
and job creation requires positive action at EU and national levels to support competitiveness and social 
inclusion…action to promote the right framework to help businesses create jobs and find new markets” 
(Commission 2011b, 3) 
296 (Barroso 2010, 2) 
297 (Barroso 2010, 3) 
298 (Barroso 2010, 3) "We do not have much room for fiscal stimulus…but that does not mean we cannot do 
more to promote growth….those with the fiscal space available can explore it in a sustainable way [but] all 
member states need to promote structural reforms so we can increase our competitiveness in the world and 
promote growth” (Barroso 2011, 7) “Lasting sustainable growth and higher living standards can only be built on 
sound public finances, deep structural reform and targeted investment. These challenges can only be met if there 
Is sufficient growth” (European Commission 2012, 3) “Where economic growth…turns out to be higher than 
expected, fiscal consolidation should be accelerated “(Commission 2010e, 4)  
299 (European Commission 2012, 16)  
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spending, serving the long-term interests of all by ensuring the costs of the crisis are not 
passed on to the next generation,300 increasing investors’ confidence in the EU.301 The 
perceived implications of ‘sustainability’ must be contrasted with the discourse between 
1958-1979, where it is expressly stated that economic recovery and growth is conditional 
upon ensuring that the means used are socially acceptable,302given that "...a permanently 
restrictive approach to public expenditure would hamper the effort being made to satisfy the 
growing needs of the community."303  
 
It also contrasts considerably with the way that environmental policy was originally 
conceived. Sustainability has always been inherent in the overall approach to environmental 
policy, but in the early years of the community its intrinsic importance for welfare was the 
primary consideration, requiring that growth be "sufficiently controlled" to give priority to 
"values such as responsibility towards other people, the present and future generations and 
towards their natural and social environment."304  
 
While the conception of the “Distribution” dimension that emerged in 1979, attributing 
overriding importance to increasing aggregate growth, continues to dominate the discourse, 
more so than in previous periods, inequalities are now seen to be a problem exclusively for 
investor confidence and growth potential. The discourse sees poverty as a potential drain on 
economic growth and equates the problem of unequal social and economic conditions 
between countries with the creation of divergent competitive conditions.305  The need to 
                                            
300 “Fiscal responsibility is not contrary to the social values of Europe. It means ‘not passing on the cost of the 
crisis to the next generation’” (Thyssen 2015)  
301 Sustainable growth is growth that will convince the market of the long-term stability of the European 
economy: “The most urgent task for the EU is to restore confidence…stronger fiscal consolidation is needed…” 
(Commission 2010e, 4) 
302 (Vouel 1977a, 3) 
303 (Commission 1966a, III–3) 
304 (Carpentier 1972, 11, 6–7) 
305  See :“The poverty divide is a threat to the EMU…this is why the Community and Member States agreed on 
the scoreboard of key employment and social indicators” (Andor 2014a) “The point is to create conditions 
enabling us to restore convergence in employment and social outcomes and other economic fundamentals 
throughout the currency union, so that we strengthen the whole EMU’s growth potential”. (Andor 2014b) 
“Insufficient investment in social policies that strengthen human capital development…can contribute to 
explaining differences in economic competitiveness between States and the current disequilibria observed in the 
EU…reducing productive potential” (Commission 2013b, 8) 
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“[pay] attention to the most vulnerable” derives from the fact that doing so “has a positive 
impact on growth and creates benefits enjoyed by all.”306 “Society as a whole bears the social 
and economic costs of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion.”307  
 
While the discourse assumes that ‘social investment’ will promote the labour participation 
necessary to remedy poverty and social exclusion,308 such policies are contingent on 
prioritizing growth. This means that fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms, 
which might have difficult consequences for particular groups, are seen to be necessary if 
these social problems are to be addressed in the longer term:309 “The process of restructuring 
our economies is disruptive, politically challenging and socially difficult, but it is necessary 
to lay the foundations for future growth and competiveness that will be smart, sustainable and 
inclusive.”310 The discourse expresses the belief that it does not matter how the costs of the 
process are distributed, because prioritising growth at all costs now, will ultimately ‘remedy’ 
problems such as poverty and exclusion in the longer-term.311  The unequal distribution of 
the ‘social consequences of the crisis’ are only seen to be of concern if this might undermine 
growth.312 In sharp contrast to this discourse, the discourse between 1958 and 1973 firmly 
rejects the view that 'necessary' restructuring should dictate the present-day social conditions 
of citizens: "Unless these problems, of inequalities and of the unacceptable by-products of 
                                            
306 (Commission 2010g, 13) 
307 (Commission 2013b, 2) 
308 Given that there “are clear signs of increases in the number of people at risk of income poverty…and social 
exclusion, with acute health problems and homelessness in the most extreme cases” a policy priority should be 
“Ensuring access to services supporting integration in the labour market” (Commission 2011a, 12) “To promote 
inclusion and to prevent poverty: Active inclusion strategies should be developed….as well as broad access to 
affordable and high quality services such as social and health services, childcare, housing and energy supply” 
(Commission 2012b, 12) “The targets are inter-related…better educational levels help employability and 
progress in increasing the employment rate helps to reduce poverty”  (Commission 2010b, 8) 
309 (Barroso 2011; European Commission 2012; Barroso 2012; Commission 2013b) 
310 (Commission 2013b, 3) 
311 “Restoring economic growth with more and better jobs will be the key to the fight against poverty” 
(Commission 2010g, 3)  
312 “The crisis has had a particularly negative impact on the most disadvantaged and the share of people at risk 
of poverty has risen to 24% in the EU. This also includes a growing risk of structural unemployment and 
increased exit from the labour market, which could have significantly negative effects on EU growth potential” 
(Commission 2013d, 11) “The poverty divide is a threat to the EMU…”  (Andor 2014a, 672) See also: “The 
combination of high unemployment rates ,low participation in the labour market and fewer hours worked 
compared to other parts of the world undermines the EU’s economic performance.” (Commission 2010e, 5)  
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growth can be resolved, economic growth will fail to provide the quality of life our people 
rightly expect from it...Unless the process of growth can be put more fully to the services of 
society, growth itself might become politically unacceptable"313 
In the post-2010 period, a socially just Europe is seen to be “a Europe of opportunity where 
those that aspire are elevated and those in need are not neglected”,314  an EU where effort is 
rewarded.315 Equality of opportunity to access the market, itself instrumental in increasing 
aggregate growth, is the limit of what policy intervention should aim to achieve. While the 
discourse states that the most vulnerable must not be ‘left behind’,316 or ‘neglected’, such 
persons are stigmatised in the discourse for not taking advantage of the opportunities 
provided to them.317  
What emerges most clearly in the discourse during this period, as compared even with the 
discourse as it was developing from 1979, is a sense that inequality is positively justified. The 
emphasis on the virtue of long-term growth appears to have supplanted the duty on states to 
meet the present day welfare requirements of citizens.318 Consequently, by looking to the 
prospects that future growth and prosperity could bring, it almost seems as if the very reason 
that growth and prosperity is said to be important is no longer considered. Moreover, it 
appears that, provided that growth is likely to occur, the impact of the means used to achieve 
it is only relevant if there is a risk that negative externalities might slow down the process.  
RELATIONSHIP  
                                            
313 (Commission 1973c, 13) 
314 (Barroso 2010) 
315 There is a slight shift in the tenor of the discourse after 2014. There is a reference to “Prosperity for all, not 
just a few” but only in a few isolated sources. (Juncker 2014b) 
316 (Barroso 2010, 4) 
317 This framing is used to justify the minimal nature of the ‘safety-nets’ seen to be ‘required’. For example, the 
discourse refers to the need to review unemployment benefits “to ensure that they provide incentives to work, 
avoid benefit dependency…” (Commission 2010e, 6) This must be contrasted with the discourse in the first 
period: … “Satisfactory economic growth, a high level of employment, balanced payments and stable prices” 
are “only acceptable if the distribution of these incomes improves simultaneously” (Commission 1971a, 46) 
318 To be contrasted with "It is not sufficient to know if wealth has increased, and by how much, but also 
knowing how it has been distributed, and the benefits distributed" (Levi-Sandri 1970a, 1) 
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The discourse states that all public spending should be growth oriented319because it is 
believed that growth is the source of jobs and welfare,320 to be created by increasing global 
competitiveness.321 It sees vigorous fiscal adjustment,322alongside far-reaching structural 
reforms,323 more ‘open markets,’ further liberalisation of services,324lower public 
expenditure,325 and policies designed to create investor326 and business friendly regulatory 
environments,327 as the means through which to guarantee welfare.  
 
Just as was the case in the dominant discourse from 1979, all policies derive their importance 
from their direct contribution to growth, or their contribution to competitiveness or labour 
market participation: the sources of the opportunities on which welfare is seen to 
depend.328Public expenditure on policy measures is seen to be justified only if short or long-
                                            
319 (Commission 2010b; Barroso 2010; Commission 2010a; Commission 2011a; Commission 2012b; European 
Commission 2012) 
320It sees growth as the source of jobs, and therefore of opportunities and prosperity for all. See: (Barroso 2009, 
29); “Markets do not exist in isolation. They exist to serve a purpose. And that purpose is prosperity for all” 
where the single market is “the rock on which European growth is built” (Barroso 2009, 28) It also frequently 
states that the benefits of the EU for citizens derive from growth (Commission 2010b; Barroso 2011, 11; 
Barroso 2012) 
321 The discourse frequently states that growth is the ultimate aim of all policy and many sources stress that the 
overriding policy priorities are growth and jobs: (Barroso 2013; Commission 2014d, 2; European Commission 
2010, 3)(Commission 2010b; Barroso 2009; Commission 2010a; Commission 2010g; Barroso 2010; European 
Commission 2010; Commission 2011b)  Many sources stress that competitiveness is the source of growth and 
jobs: (Barroso 2009; Commission 2010b; Barroso 2011; Commission 2010a, 777; Commission 2010e; 
Commission 2011a; Barroso 2012; Juncker 2014a) 
322 (Commission 2010d; Commission 2010b; Commission 2010g; Barroso 2010, 10; Commission 2011a; 
Commission 2010e; European Commission 2012; Juncker 2014a; Commission 2014d; Commission 2014c)   
323 (Commission 2010b; Commission 2010f; Barroso 2010, 10; Barroso 2011, 11; Commission 2010e; 
Commission 2012b; Barroso 2012, 12; Commission 2012b; Commission 2013b; Barroso 2013; Commission 
2014c; Thyssen 2014; Commission 2014d; Commission 2014c) 
324 (Commission 2010d; Commission 2010a; Barroso 2009; Barroso 2010; Barroso 2012; Juncker 2014b) 
325 (Commission 2010e, 6)  
326 (Commission 2014c; Commission 2014d; Juncker 2014b; Barroso 2012, 12) 
327 (Commission 2010d; Commission 2010a; Commission 2010f; Barroso 2010; Commission 2010e; 
Commission 2011a; European Commission 2012; Barroso 2012, 12; Commission 2014c; Juncker 2014b; 
Commission 2014c) 
328 (Commission 2010b, 17) “The basis for the [Europe 2020] strategy is our commitment to open and sound 
markets…. it is based on a staunch defence of the internal market, and the competition and state aid rules, which 
provide a level playing field, guaranteeing access and opportunity for all…namely consumers and SMEs” 
(Barroso 2009, 11) “Our prospects for a prosperous union depend on Europeans having the opportunities to 
secure a better future for themselves and their families. Restoring economic growth with more and better jobs 
will be the key to the fight against poverty” (Commission 2010g, 3) 
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term economic gain is envisaged.329All policies must be conceived within an overall 
framework of fiscal consolidation and cost-efficiency,330requiring “sometimes very painful” 
adjustments, because “it is only through these reforms that we can come to a better 
future.”331The discourse sees growth-enhancing items as the priorities for spending, while 
spending on public services is the main target for cuts and reforms designed to increase cost-
effectiveness and efficiency.332 In the context of the 1970s recession, public spending on 
public services was actually prioritised.333 Here, the overriding frame is that every policy has 
to prove it will increase growth or competitiveness to be legitimate and/or permitted.  
This understanding underpins the approach to all policy areas: 
 
State aid must be targeted at market failures so as not to keep “inefficient and non-viable 
companies on life support.”334 It is a horizontal tool and must be designed to help member 
states re-launch growth while ensuring fiscal sustainability.335 Investing in skills and jobs and 
on social inclusion is seen to be necessary given the risk that “a structural mismatch between 
the supply and demand for labour …will hinder recovery and long term growth”336 and 
“Future economic growth and competitiveness requires investing in human capital.”337 
 
Meeting the poverty target “…will also bring economic benefit for the society as a whole” by 
increasing labour market participation, lowering the costs associated with social protection, 
                                            
329 This justifies expenditure on social services: “Social services are therefore essential for fostering inclusive 
growth: economically, expenditure on these services enhances human capital and thus is a form of investment, a 
social investment with mid-to long-term returns to individuals, society and the economy as a whole”… “This is 
why the Annual Growth Survey 2013, when calling for additional efforts to promote social inclusion and to 
tackle poverty, asks the Member States to ensure ‘broad access to affordable and high quality 
services…”(Commission 2013a, 3) 
330 (Commission 2011a) “The Stability and Growth Pact provides the appropriate framework for a flexible and 
efficient fiscal adjustment” (Commission 2012b, 4) 
331 (Barroso 2012) 
332 (Commission 2012b, 5; Commission 2011a, 9; Commission 2013d, 7) 
333 (Commission 1975b, 8) 
334 (Commission 2013c, 6) 
335 (Commission 2013c, 6) See also: “Unlawful government subsidies can tilt the level playing field, erect 
unnecessary barriers and squander the growth potential of the internal market”.(Commission 2014a, 7) 
336 (Commission 2011a, 10) 
337 (Commission 2013b, 2–3) 
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and contributing to economic growth. 338 It is because expenditure on social services is “a 
form of investment” that broad access to high quality services is seen as an important way to 
promote social inclusion and combat poverty.339 The need to make social protection systems 
more ‘effective’ is seen to derive from the argument that: “Effective social protection systems 
that help those in need [are] not an obstacle to prosperity. It is an indispensable element of 
it….it is precisely those countries with the most effective social protection systems…that are 
among the most competitive and successful economies of the world.”340  
 
The discourse expresses the belief that it is only if, and to the extent that, environmental 
policies contribute to growth and competitiveness that they are legitimate: “There can be no 
contradiction between the short term measures taken today and the long term sustainability 
and competitiveness of the European economy”341 because “Green and growth must go 
together.”342  Cohesion policy and the structural funds are justified because the growth 
potential of the EU depends on eliminating imbalances in economic competitiveness, and 
increasing market confidence.343  
 
The discourse expresses the belief that it is important to assess the ‘social impact’ of policy, 
but only to the extent that social problems might detract from growth and/or 
competitiveness.344 The discourse sees policies that contribute to growth as sufficient and 
optimal for meeting welfare requirements. This is seen to imply that welfare requires that 
                                            
338 (European Commission 2012, 11) The problem of poverty is reduced to a problem of “increasing pressures 
on public spending, leading to difficult trade-offs for the provision of social services and benefits.” (European 
Commission 2012, 14) 
339 (Commission 2013a, 3) 
340 (Barroso 2012, 6) 
341 (Barroso 2009, 19) 
342 (Barroso 2011, 7) 
343 This comes through particularly strongly in: (Andor 2014b; Barroso 2011) The latter emphasizes the need to 
do what is “credible from the market’s point of view” . Expenditure on cohesion policy is also seen to ensure 
that all actors are committed to implementing the EU’s strategy and is therefore important for ensuring that the 
growth and competition objectives are not undermined: “Economic, social and territorial cohesion will remain at 
the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy to ensure that all energies and capacities are mobilised and focused on the 
pursuit of the strategy’s policies. Cohesion policy and its structural funds…are key delivery mechanisms to 
achieve [these priorities].”(Commission 2010b, 21) 
344 (Commission 2011a, 10) 
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growth be prioritised, such that the immediate ‘social impact’ must be subordinated to what 
growth requires if welfare requirements are to be met.  
 
Considerations of social fairness are referred to occasionally in the discourse after 2013,345 
and it is expressly stated in one speech that: “Mistakes were made [in the measures taken 
during the crisis]. There was a lack of social fairness”346 …“in the future, any support and 
reform programme [must] go through not only a fiscal sustainability assessment, but a social 
impact assessment as well”… “I will not sacrifice Europe’s safety, health, social and decent 
protection standards or our cultural diversity on the alter of free trade.”347  
  
However, it is clear that even after 2013, ‘social fairness’ is seen as an important 
consideration for policy only if there is ‘fiscal space’ available to consider it.348It is still the 
case that: “This is about one thing: growth, which is necessary to remedy today’s most 
pressing problem: unemployment…Europe must therefore speed up the pace of structural 
reforms. At the EU level exploiting the potential of the single market comes first.”349 The 
consequences of giving ‘greater consideration’ to social fairness are no more evident in the 
2015 programme or annual growth survey than in previous years.350 Even when ‘fairness’ is 
seen to be an important matter for policies to pursue, the legitimacy of doing so is conditional 
                                            
345 This is particularly evident after the new Commission takes office in 2014.  
346 (Juncker 2014b) 
347 (Juncker 2014b, 8) 
348 (Commission 2014c, 14)  The only substantive change in the discourse in the 2013 annual growth survey is 
the statement: “In line with the Stability and Growth Pact…strategies should focus on…a composition of 
adjustment which supports growth and social fairness” BUT “The Stability and Growth pact provides the 
appropriate framework for a flexible and efficient adjustment” “(Commission 2012b, 4) While “Solidarity and 
fairness…will be essential elements in ensuring that the efforts undertaken will be politically and socially 
acceptable” beyond this the discourse merely subtly reframes the discourse that was present in the previous 
reports, to suggest that the measures that have been said to be required since 2011, are actually about 
“countering the effects of the crisis” rather than purely increasing the employment rate or increasing growth 
(Commission 2012b, 12,13). See also (Commission 2013d, 11) except for one statement: “The internal market 
provisions cannot be valued more highly than social provisions, which otherwise would just be minimum 
standards. The internal market does not automatically have priority. Social factors must also play a role in 
Europe” (Juncker 2014b, 16) 
349 (Commission 2013b, 5) “The New economic narrative of the Commission is built around three main strands 
– boosting investment, pursuing structural reforms and fiscal responsibility” (Commission 2014d, 4) 
350 Fairness is referred to only in the context of tax avoidance and the judicial system, and the only evidence that 
‘social impact’ is being considered is in the statement “Work has already been started to strengthen the social 
dimension of the EMU” (Commission 2014c, 17) 
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upon being compatible with growth.351 Prioritising growth is seen to have such positive long-
term effects for meeting welfare requirements, that the immediate ‘social impact’ of policy is 
seen to be of very limited importance. 
HOW 
In the post-2010 period, a defining feature of the discourse is that the economic crisis appears 
to be being interpreted as if it is the direct result of policy failure, rather than market failure. 
Consequently, what emerges in the discourse is a sense that there is no longer any legitimate 
role for policies that do not obey the market, and it is the EU who is seen to be best placed to 
ensure that policies are thereby constructed appropriately.  
 
The overriding belief expressed in the post-2010 discourse is that the market must dictate the 
content of policies otherwise investor confidence, macro-economic stability and 
competitiveness, and therefore growth and welfare, will be undermined. This is a clear 
contrast with the objective conception of welfare seen to be of overriding importance in the 
first period.352 
 
A discourse strand concerning consultation and participation has been developing since the 
early 1990s, and it is clear in the post-2010 period that this aspect of policy is now seen to be 
completely distinct from practical matters related to policy-formation. It does not qualify the 
overriding belief that the needs of business and the market should provide the basis of policy.  
The Treaty requires broad consultation and regular dialogue with civil society for the 
purposes of policy-making. 353  The discourse emphasises that almost all policies have been 
preceded by broad public consultation. As was the case in the 1993-2010 period, at times the 
discourse appears to see consultation with citizens as important to ensure that policy is 
                                            
351 The new agenda, set out in the 2014 Political  guidelines, are ‘launched’ by means of a package for “Jobs, 
Growth and Investment” embodied by an ‘integrated approach’ combining “Structural, fiscal and monetary” 
policies in a “growth-friendly” way encompassing “structural reforms, fiscal responsibility and investment”. 
(Commission 2014c, 4–5) It is still believed that “Ambitious structural reforms…through the effects on growth, 
productivity and employment…can contribute to improving the overall social situation and reducing poverty, as 
well as the sustainability of private and public debt.”(Commission 2014c, 10) 
352 It is stated to be a duty of the state and the Community to guarantee "the conditions for true fulfilment" 
(Levi-Sandri 1970b, 3)  
353 (2007, Art.11) 
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adequately tailored to meeting welfare requirements354 but this does not appear to match with 
the way that consultation is conceived in practice.  
 
The way the discourse is articulated implies that these policies are conceived in light of an 
awareness of the growing public discontent over the EU’s legitimacy and its so-called 
‘democratic’ deficit, issues which many provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon were also 
designed to address.355 It often seems that participation is seen to be purely instrumental for 
mobilising support for policy measures,356 and for ensuring that controversial policies are 
‘properly’ implemented.357  
 
The discourse does not indicate how, or if, the results of consultation and dialogue might 
form the basis of, or lead to modification or supplementation, of specific policies.358 The way 
in which the duty to consult has been performed has been heavily criticised, particularly in 
respect of the consultation that preceded the Europe 2020 strategy.359 Overall, establishing 
the specific concerns of citizens is predominantly seen to be an important way to gauge 
public opinion upon which to base information campaigns designed to increase perceptions of 
legitimacy.360 
                                            
354 “European Citizens’ involvement is vital for the success of our efforts, not only as passive beneficiaries but 
as actors…involv(ed) in policy-making. Such tools can bring more depth and a qualitative aspect of 
understanding to citizen’s concerns.” (Commission 2010f, 23) 
355  (EUR-lex 2014) 
 356 (Barroso 2011, 8) See a similar interpretation in: (Cseres and Schrauwen 2012, 12–13)  
357“There is a need for greater involvement of national parliaments, social partners and civil society in order to 
serve public understanding and acceptance of the necessary reforms.”  (Commission 2013b) See also: (Brussel 
2014, 13) 
 358 For similar criticisms:(Cseres and Schrauwen 2012; DAWSON 2011) To be contrasted with the discourse 
from 1985, where the strategy adopted by the Commission in 1985 was expressly constructed on the basis of the 
preferences expressed by ‘civil society’ wherein civil society consists entirely of industrial and governmental 
representatives. It appeared to be a strategy used to convince governments over the ‘correctness’ of the approach 
being taken at Community level. (Commission 1985, 7)  
359 The consultation process ran from November 2009 until January 2010 (only three months before the strategy 
was launched) and the document was ‘deliberately’ vague. It provoked a lot of criticism from a number of 
NGO’s and MEP’s who wanted to delay the process to leave time to develop a social plan to be incorporated in 
the strategy: (Copeland and James 2014, 8) The overall tendency appears to be to give the views of stakeholders 
more emphasis than those of citizens, to overlook the duty entirely where significant changes in policy are 
concerned, and to draft consultation documents in a way that is too vague, or too technical and complex, to 
facilitate meaningful responses.(European Citizen Access Service 2013) (Dinan 2011, 8) 
360 (Commission 2001a, 21,23) 
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The fact that a policy has been preceded by broad public consultation does not necessarily 
imply that the information obtained has been considered.361Many of the consultation 
questions are framed in such a way as to pre-empt the responses that can be given.362 It seems 
that broad consultation is seen to be a way to build support for preconceived policies among 
different groups in society so as to increase the likelihood of adoption. The discourse from 
this and the previous period clearly suggests that citizens’ concerns cannot supersede the 
overriding importance attributed to meeting the needs of businesses and the market. This does 
not therefore mark a qualitative change from the way in which this aspect has been conceived 
since 1979. Consultation and citizen participation seems to be seen as more important for 
increasing public awareness of the EU363 and mobilising support for policies, than for 
directly informing policy strategies themselves.364 It is too early to tell if the discourse 
produced by the new Commission marks a qualitative change.365The significance of this 
aspect of the discourse is discussed more fully in Section Five.  
 
While the mechanisms, and the substantive policies, were less developed between 1958 and 
1979, the discourse clearly expressed the belief that ensuring that all citizens were able to 
contribute to the building of Europe, and informing the Commission of the most pressing 
social problems, was of extreme importance. The EU's conception of this aspect of social 
justice has clearly transformed considerably.  
                                            
 361 There is little evidence that the conclusions from consultation are taken into account in the formation of the 
policy. See: (Commission 2009) There is evidence that despite a number of flag-ship initiatives to enhance 
citizen participation for the purpose of informing EU policy-makers, there is little evidence that any of the 
conclusions reached via these processes are actually fed into on-going policy discussions. See: (Boucher 2009, 
11) A discourse analysis of communication policy documents has revealed that dialogue with citizens is seen to 
be primarily important to improve perceptions of the EU and promote awareness. (Brussel 2014, 9) There is an 
additional problem raised by the lack of representativeness of the consultations, the lack of transparency in what 
principles determine which opinions are considered and the lack of procedures to guarantee equality in the 
context of who can participate in decision-making. Moreover, the Commission is free to accept or reject views 
without explanation. See: (Cseres and Schrauwen 2012; SANCO 2007)  
 362 In the context of cohesion policy, for example, see: (European Commission 2005b, 33) The three questions 
were “To what extent should cohesion policy support the growth and jobs agenda and the Lisbon process? What 
new element might be included in order to address this agenda? What aspects do you consider to be less relevant 
to this agenda?” This is an aspect of the EU’s consultations that has been noticed by others: (Quittkat 2011, 
661–662)(Brussel 2014, 11)(Cseres and Schrauwen 2012; Kohler-Koch 2010, 100–116).  
363 (Commission 2010f, 20–21) 
364 (Barroso 2009, 34) 
365 Some speeches of the President of the European Commission appears to express the belief that it is necessary 
to assess the real impact of policies on people’s lives, and use these assessments to inform future policies. 
(Juncker 2014b, 18) 
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WHO 
This aspect of social justice has been conceived in a similar way since 1979, with the market 
seen to be the most efficient setter of standards and decider of distributional outcomes, 
leaving little room for state-specific policies. Given the way the causes of the crisis are 
conceived in this period, the need to boost competitiveness and stabilise global financial 
markets is seen to be more important than preserving the powers of the Member States to 
tailor the way they respond to the crisis to the particular needs and preferences of their 
societies. 366 State policies themselves are seen to be to blame for the crisis. This means the 
market is believed to be best-placed to dictate the content and orientation of policies because 
restoring competitiveness and stabilising the markets is the only way that the ‘crisis’ can be 
addressed, growth restored, and welfare requirements met. This means that, unlike during the 
late 1980s and 1990s, even EU policies are entirely dictated by what it believes the market 
requires. EU policies are no longer believed to be required to manipulate or correct the 
market, but instead to enforce its requirements. The crucial difference between this and the 
conception dominant between 1979 and 1985 is that member states are not trusted to obey the 
market on their own.  
 
Given that it is through competitiveness, stability and growth that ‘best results’ are seen to be 
achieved, the discourse sees the EU as better placed than states to determine how the 
“European Interest” should be pursued.367 It frames the ‘global’ nature of the ‘problems’ that 
face the EU – not just the economic crisis, but also globalisation and competition more 
generally - in such a way as to imply that Member States are not capable of determining 
appropriate policy responses on their own.368It adopts different diagnoses of the ‘crisis’ at 
different times in order to serve the purposes of this argument.369 It seems to be believed that 
                                            
366 This is particularly evident in the way the discourse subordinates the cultural importance of wage-setting 
mechanisms to the need for increased competitiveness; in its approach to state aid and to services of general 
interest. (European Commission 2012, 14) (Commission 2013c, 6) (Commission 2014a, 7) 
367 The discourse refers to an overriding “European interest” and the need to “kill off the idea that the member 
state and EU level are rivals. Everyone should be working to the same goal – to serve the best results for 
citizens.” (Barroso 2009, 38) 
368 “We need more than ever the independent authority of the Commission to propose and assess the actions that 
the member states should take – Governments…cannot do this by themselves” (Barroso 2011, 2) (Barroso 2012) 
369 In 2010, the crisis is framed as an economic and governance crisis stemming from unsustainable budgets: 
blamed for the unraveling of the ‘social safety net.’ This underpins arguments for increased surveillance, 
monitoring and incentives for compliance over macro-economic policy at EU level. (Barroso 2010) In 2011, the 
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only the EU is capable of formulating the policy objectives that can meet welfare 
requirements because only ‘EU’ objectives are likely to be entirely ‘dictated’ by the 
market.370  
 
The discourse reinforces this argument by stating that only by pursuing reforms initiated at 
EU level, and meeting EU objectives, will ‘our’ values and ‘our’ social model be preserved. 
Only the EU can pursue the “European interest” which ensures the values of all European 
societies are preserved. This articulation appears to be intended to imply that, given the 
shared nature of these values, there is no need for member states to retain significant policy 
autonomy.371While similar arguments were used to justify common action between 1958 and 
1979, by contrast, there was no presumption that EU action was exclusive or that state 
autonomy should be curtailed more than absolutely necessary.372  
 
In contrast to the first period, the discourse expresses the belief that sensitivity to national 
diversity requires context-sensitive policy implementation, rather than a culturally sensitive 
and differentiated approach to policy formation.373 It understands ‘diversity’ as referring to 
differences in economic and social circumstances, rather than in cultures or value systems.374 
This means that respecting diversity is achieved by “pursuing differentiated growth-friendly 
                                                                                                                                        
crisis is framed as both a sovereign debt crisis and a crisis of political confidence so as to underpin policies 
aimed at restoring confidence through greater stability and growth, and more collective action: “The roots of the 
crisis are well-known. Europe has not met the challenges of competitiveness. Some of our Member States have 
lived beyond their means. Some behavior in the financial markets have been irresponsible and inadmissible. We 
have allowed imbalances between our Member States to grow, particularly in the euro area. (Barroso 2011, 7) In 
2012, the diagnosis adopted is used to reinforce the need for fiscal consolidation and an even greater focus on 
competitiveness: “Irresponsible practices in the financial sector, unsustainable public debt and a lack of 
competitiveness in some member states”(Barroso 2012). Overall, all objectives are seen to require EU action, 
because all the problems facing the EU are framed as either caused by allowing member states to act alone, or to 
be undermined if the perception of unity is undermined in the market. Other writers have found similar trends in 
the discourse as it relates to trade policy: (De Ville and Orbie 2014) 
370 This underpins the way the new framework of country-reporting operates (Commission 2010b, 27) 
371 “This [European Unity and more integration] is the only way we will get the scale and efficiency we need to 
be a global player…to safeguard our values…in a changing world” (Barroso 2012) “Determined fiscal 
consolidation (as mandated by Commission priority-setting)…is essential for restoring macro-financial stability 
as a basis for growth and securing the future of the European Social Model “ (Commission 2011a, 4) 
372 This is because the Community is "an economic order based on freedom [but one which] can only exist...at 
the price of constant state intervention" (Commission 1962, 5) 
373 The Union “Shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity” (2007, Art.2(4) TEU) 
374 Whereas in the first period, it is expressly stated that Community Policy must make allowance for differences 
in states' "scales of values" (Commission 1971b, 11) 
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fiscal consolidation” but such “differentiated strategies should be pursued within the common 
framework, taking account of country-specific fiscal and macro-financial risks,”375 and 
within the constraints of “the overall objective of fiscal consolidation”.376 This means the 
structural reforms seen to be necessary are those required to make tax, pension, labour and 
social protection systems ‘more competitive’ irrespective of the risk that pressures from 
regulatory competition might result in a lower standard of protection.377In contrast, the 
discourse in the early period expressly believed that competition could never be allowed to 
lead to a lowering in social standards, and it was this that underpinned the approach to 
harmonization.378It is clear that the conception of this aspect of social justice has changed 
significantly.  
 
  
                                            
375 (Commission 2011a, 24) (Commission 2014c, 4) 
376 (Commission 2011a) 
377 The discourse also sees international trade as being in the best interest of the European Citizen, requiring 
deregulation in the pursuit of ‘open markets’ thus increasing the ‘need’ to ensure the market is the prime setter 
of standards(Commission 2010d, 5) There is one exception, but this does not appear to indicate a change of 
approach: “This Commission is making a political priority of lightening the regulatory load while keeping high 
levels of social, health and environmental protection and consumer choice. We will overhaul the rules to make 
sure they contribute to the jobs and growth agenda and do not impose unnecessary red tape or administrative 
burdens, while at the same time bringing the benefits that citizens expect” However, there does not appear to be 
any indication of how these standards are being ensured as part of this process given that active measures to 
guarantee them are not seen to be necessary. Moreover, given that competitiveness is seen to be crucial for the 
‘jobs and growth’ agenda, this seems to be a re-framing of the discourse more than a qualitative change, 
particularly in the context of the new growth initiative.  (Commission 2014d, 3) This interpretation is supported 
by: (Commission 2014c, 9) 
378  "the task of the Community in the social field is not to equalize but to establish minimum standards, below 
which nobody should be allowed to fall, but on the basis of which those who can afford to do so should build 
their own more ambitious systems. Thus nobody's social advance should be held back by Community 
measures" (Shanks 1977a, 380) 
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SECTION FIVE: DISCUSSION 
In this section, an attempt is made to examine in more detail what the analysis suggests in 
terms of how discourse, and the underlying conceptions behind it, can change. Gaining a 
better understanding of this process is important to better appreciate the relationship between 
the discourse, the conception of social justice, and different legislative and social outcomes, 
to understand the likely trajectory of European policy-making, and to reveal potential 
avenues for reform.  This is particularly important given that the analysis has shown how 
different the EU's conception of justice is today from that which dominated its first 20 years 
of existence, and also, it seems, from the conception of social justice of its citizens.379  
 
The section will begin by drawing on the findings from this paper and the discourse analysis 
of all the five periods, to explore the process of change and determine what light it can shed 
on understanding the future development of the EU. It will then use this to discuss some of 
the issues that have been raised in the context of two particular aspects of social justice: 
“How” and “Focus”. These areas illustrate most clearly the changes that have taken place in 
the EU's conception of social justice. More than any other aspect, they are intrinsically linked 
with much broader questions over the nature of EU governance and the problem of its 
‘legitimacy’. Perhaps as a result, they have given rise to much discursive struggle in relation 
to a number of issues and policy areas, particularly from 1979 onwards.  
UNDERSTANDING CHANGE 
The analysis supports the view that discursive change is a process that occurs when actors 
draw on the discursive resources available to them to help them make sense of the broader 
political, economic and institutional environment they find themselves in. Changes in this 
broader environment have to be ‘understood’ by these actors and they then have to be 
articulated in a way that is meaningful both to them, and to those for whom the discourse is 
intended.  
 
This means that the EU’s policy-discourse constrains and to some extent produces the very 
conceptions of social justice that it articulates. It is both the resource that enables it to 
                                            
379 As suggested by changing public attitudes toward the EU.  
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understand the world and the tool it deploys to make these understandings cognisable to 
others.380 This means that familiar concepts and understandings have to be constantly 
reconceptualised and reframed, and this increases the likelihood that alternative 
understandings might emerge. Change should not, therefore, be seen to necessarily result 
from any ‘calculated’ attempt by actors to ‘overthrow’ a particular discourse. 
 
The analysis suggests that it is rare for a dominant discourse to be completely uncontested. 
The success of a competing discourse appears to depend on the extent to which it can ‘makes 
sense’ of the prevailing dominant discourse by approaching it from a different perspective, 
investing its concepts and understandings with different meanings. The analysis illustrates 
that change occurs as part of a process through which discourse strands are constantly 
supplemented, qualified, reconstructed, and reframed.  
 
The majority of the analysis tells a story of gradual change, particularly between 1979 and 
2010. The sudden and significant shift observable around 1979 is therefore challenging to 
explain. However, the context in which the EEC was operating was undergoing significant 
change in the 1970s. In a context of rising inflation and rising unemployment, the EEC was 
struggling to understand why the measures traditionally believed appropriate to resolve these 
problems were not working.  
 
The economic situation was getting worse, yet a rapid recovery was taking place in the US 
and Japan, and the perceived role of scientific progress in this process was highlighting areas 
of weakness in the EEC. The domestic political debates showed broad awareness of these 
circumstances, and were increasingly linking EEC legitimacy with economic outcomes.381 
The EEC was particularly aware of the (declining) support it enjoyed amongst its citizens.382 
The ‘post-war’ narrative that dominated the discourse of the earlier period appeared to be 
losing its resonance with the new generation, and it appeared that the EEC could no longer 
rely on economic growth as an alternative legitimating factor in its favour.   
                                            
380 (Foucault 1991, 58) (Dietz 1999, 605) 
381 (Dietz 1999, 607; Diez 2001, 27) This appears to have been particularly true in the context of the British 
political debate.  
382 Particularly so after the introduction of the Euro-barometer in 1973, and the political unrest of the late 1960s. 
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It is possible to understand the sudden change in the discourse by reference to the fact that the 
prevailing conception of social justice could no longer make sense of its broader political, 
economic and institutional environment in a way that proved convincing to all involved: its 
citizens, the member states and the EEC itself. There was a lack of fit between what it 
believed and said it was doing, what citizens expected, and what it was achieving in practice. 
The alternative discourse offered a new interpretation of the problems being faced, and 
appeared to be able to articulate this in a way that made more sense and therefore appear 
more legitimate, than the discourse that had until that point been dominant.   
 
The research indicates how this new discourse framed itself in direct opposition to the ‘old’ 
discourse. It used its related concepts, such as the ‘European Welfare State’, and re-
articulated them such that they were portrayed as the causes of the problems the new 
discourse purported to be able to address.383 It drew on discourses prevailing in the broader 
political debate to ensure these new ideas could be articulated in a way that would resonate 
with a broad range of actors.  
 
The analysis shows that, by 1985, this discourse had ‘softened’: the role of the state and the 
EU in addressing market failure had been reconceptualised and the nature of the problems 
being addressed had been reframed. The discourse has continued to shift in response to 
changing circumstances ever since, suggesting that to become stable, discourses constantly 
re-interpret the discursive environment, and the broader context, to ensure that they remain 
internally and externally coherent. This helps to explain why it is possible for conceptions of 
social justice to change over time and why the Market Model conception of social justice is 
manifested in different forms throughout the period studied. It suggests that there is a 
constant process of adjustment, ensuring an alignment between what citizens and states 
expect, and what the EU believes it should be aiming for and how.    
 
These observations help to explain why the discourse in the 1958-1979 and post-2010 periods 
seems relatively stable and uncontested. Throughout the founding years, the post-war context 
seems to have offered a shared experience upon which the discourse could draw to make 
itself cognisable. In the post-2010 context, the economic crisis seems to be playing a similar 
                                            
383 (F. Andriessen 1982, 1) 
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role. It appears that dominance and stability is more likely when there is a strong over-
arching narrative available through which discourse can be articulated. However, the 
experience of the 1958-1979 period suggests that over time, if a narrative appears to be losing 
some of its resonance, it can become exhausted. Change may then be quite fundamental, as 
was the case in 1979, particularly if a coherent and more convincing narrative is available,384 
or change can be gradual: contradictions might surface over time, but be convincingly re-
conceptualised by virtue of subtler re-articulation or reframing. Such reframing seems to be 
taking place in the post-2010 discourse, as concepts that have frequently been used 
throughout the history of the EU’s discourse, and are now embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
are being invested with new meanings.   
 
This implies that it is not possible to predict how the discourse, or more importantly the 
conception of social justice behind it, is likely to evolve in the future. The EU’s ability to 
make sense of the world depends on the discursive resources available to it at a particular 
time and on its ability to articulate a more convincing understanding that makes it, and others, 
doubt the explanatory power of the dominant discourse. The subtle reframing of the Market 
Model discourse that has taken place in light of the crisis, drawing on the legal legitimacy of 
the new Treaty, and drawing on ideas familiar to competing conceptions of social justice, 
may be enough to sustain the Market Model conception that dominates the EU today.  
 “HOW” AND “FOCUS 
The analysis has revealed that since 1979, there have been two co-existing and competing 
discourse strands in relation to the “How” dimension. The dominant discourse has remained 
stable: it stresses that the needs of business and the market must dictate the content of policy. 
However, another discourse has developed alongside it, one which has seen the input and 
participation of a progressively broader range of social actors as important for policy-making. 
It is clear, particularly in the post-2010 discourse, that this has created a tension with the 
widely accepted view that the needs of the market should be overriding.  
 
Nonetheless, it seems that both discourses have been able to co-exist because of the way that 
consultation and participation have been understood and articulated: by reference to their 
                                            
384 Some have expressed the view that globalization was the narrative that replaced the need for peace in the 
justification for European Integration today. (Delanty 1998, 3.3) 
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contribution to building consensus, increasing the effectiveness of policy, promoting 
awareness and addressing the perceived ‘lack of legitimacy’ in the EU - all matters that are 
consistent with the dominant discourse. 385 That the issues relevant to the “How” dimension 
resonate in a number of contexts has increased the ‘resources’ upon which the discourse has 
been able to draw, and has allowed these ‘contradictory’ discourse strands to co-exist for a 
significant period of time.  
 
The analysis suggests that the EU believes that improving perceptions of legitimacy is 
important to ensure the effectiveness of policy delivery. However, in the post-2010 period in 
particular, it seems that the impact of this belief has been the progressive development of a 
series of separate substantive policy areas that use communication, information and 
interaction to increase legitimacy without necessarily changing the way that policy, or social 
justice, is conceived. Consequently, the discourse appears to be being re-framed out of a 
belief that it is important for citizens to agree with the objectives being pursued, without this 
having a substantive impact on what objectives the EU actually believes it should  pursue.  
 
The analysis suggests that this was not the case during the so-called ‘legitimacy crisis’ of the 
1970s. It seems that during this period, a comprehensive attempt was being made to re-
orientate policies both out of a belief that this was what citizens desired and that this would 
be necessary for policies to be capable of achieving their intended objectives. The discourse 
clearly illustrates that the Community had begun to question the way its objectives were 
being pursued at this time, but not necessarily the objectives themselves. This is clear in the 
way that the conception of social justice remains consistent from 1958 to 1979, even though 
the substance of the policies themselves changed significantly.    
 
It may be that the key difference between this ‘legitimacy crisis’ and that which has arguably 
plagued the EU since the early 1990s,386 is that the EU’s conception of social justice in the 
1970s appears to have been consistent with that of states and citizens.387 There is little 
evidence of a conscious attempt to re-frame or re-articulate policies, to bolster legitimacy. 
Instead, it seems that it was believed that the Community had to change the practical 
                                            
385 (Brussel 2014; Michailidou 2008; C. Bee 2010, 96–98) 
386 (Dinan 2014, 1) 
387 As evidenced in: (Council 1972, Preamble, 14) 
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contribution it was making to meeting citizens’ concerns by rethinking how policies worked 
in practice.388  
 
Issues relating to the EU’s declining legitimacy were interpreted as a failure to deliver in 
practice what the Community had always, and continued, to believe it should be trying to 
achieve. It is possible that the fundamental changes that took place in the way social justice 
was conceived after 1979 indicate that the Community was beginning to question whether 
these objectives themselves were actually the cause of the Community’s declining legitimacy, 
therefore prompting a more substantial reconsideration of what ‘social justice’ really meant in 
practice. The fact that in the post-2010 period, policies appear to have been reframed but not 
fundamentally reconceptualised, may be an implicit recognition that citizens’ conception of 
social justice and that of the EU are diverging. However, this then raises the question as to 
why there has been no real substantive change in the EU’s conception of social justice.    
 
The questions which underpin the “Focus” dimension of welfare have been manifested in the 
discourse as part of the broader debate over the sort of system of governance the EU should, 
and could, be creating. This dimension raises issues in relation to the state’s role in regulating 
the market, and its relationship with society. It concerns questions at the heart of the debate 
over the relationship between states, the EU and individuals, and the nature and existence of 
‘society’ itself.  
 
The Society Model conception of the “Focus” dimension that characterises the discourse 
between 1958 and 1979 is based on an understanding of such issues which are by their nature 
state-centric and society-specific. 389 The analysis has shown that the Society Model 
conception of this dimension was strongest in the discourse before the formal introduction of 
                                            
388 For example: “it is clear that standards and expectations throughout the Community with regard to work are 
rising and rising very fast; conditions which were quite acceptable with regard to work ten or even five years 
ago are unacceptable today”. This recognition underpins a series of new concrete proposals for how to help to 
‘humanize’ work: (Shanks 1974, 2)  
 389 In the context of the ‘welfare state’ and European integration, Ferrera has made a similar point. The concept 
of the welfare state presupposes the existence of a clearly demarcated and cohesive society whose members 
believe they belong to the same whole, as a part of which they face similar risks and have similar needs. He 
refers to the concept of 'closure' as the fundamental pre-condition for the development of an ethos of social 
solidarity and redistributive arrangements within a given space. In contrast, European integration is underpinned 
by a logic of opening, aimed at fostering free-movement and non-discrimination, thereby weakening the 
traditional special demarcation and closure practices that nation states have historically built around themselves. 
This same change can be seen as a challenge in the context of many of the assumptions on which the Society 
Model is built.  (Ferrera 2009) 
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European citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht.390 It is clear, however, that the form in 
which European citizenship was embodied in the Treaty was consistent with the evolving 
Market Model conception of the "Focus" dimension, developing from 1979 and clearly 
manifested in the post-2010 discourse. This contrasts with the way that European citizenship 
and identity were conceived during the early years of the Community.391It appears that the 
challenges that the process of integration were raising, were more difficult to reconcile with 
the assumptions underpinning the Society Model than the Market Model from which the 
concept ultimately developed during the 1980s and 1990s. 392 
 
In the early years of economic integration, the concrete rights that citizens’ derived directly 
from the Community were essentially economic. Yet, from the early 1970s it is clear that, 
with new legislation in the area of social policy, and against the background of the Social 
Action Programme, these rights were becoming progressively broader. At the same time, 
ideas of political rights – floated particularly in the Tindemans report and developed in the 
Adonnino report –were becoming part of what the idea of European citizenship was seen to 
convey. The way in which the role of the state, of rights and of participation were understood 
in the context of the Society Model conception was therefore being challenged from a 
number of different angles, particularly in the 1970s. To maintain the purely ‘economic’ 
character of European citizenship was inconsistent with the way that rights were seen to ‘fit’ 
within the broader social order. However, given the link this conception made between 
                                            
390 The definition of Citizenship commonly found in the literature is "the relationship between individuals and 
the political community": (Delanty 2002, 288) Delanty has argued that citizenship, however conceived, covers 
issues of rights, duties, participation and identity. It is therefore intimately linked with the issues at the heart of 
this dimension of welfare.   
 391 In the early years of the Community, consistently with the dominating Society Model conception, the way in 
which European citizenship was constructed in the discourse was quite different from the legal form it was to 
take in the Treaty. It has been shown, through an analysis of the Commission’s discourse on European identity, 
that in the 1970s, the idea of European citizenship was strongly tied to ideas of citizenship associated with the 
nation state. The discourse in the 1970s therefore left the door open for a federal type social citizenship, 
emphasizing collective identity and collective social needs. This collective identity was based on a common 
cultural heritage, and made the link between this and ideas of collective need and social welfare. From the 
1980s, the link between culture and identity and social welfare was gradually lost from the discourse, tied 
instead to individual market opportunity, shifting the conception of citizenship rights from social rights of 
welfare towards civil rights of an economic kind. This then gave European citizenship a fundamentally political, 
as opposed to social and cultural, character - as is now reflected in its Treaty form. These findings are consistent 
with the analysis of the discourse in this paper. For two studies of Commission discourse in relation to European 
citizenship, see: (D. C. Bee 2008; Hansen 2000) For an alternative perspective drawing on legislation and case 
law in the founding years, see: (Olsen 2008, 53) for a similar analysis of the points made, see: (Somek 2008, 
200–227) Two primary sources of interest: (Tindemans 1975; Adonnino 1985)  
 392 For an empirical look at the origins of European citizenship in the early stages of European integration, see: 
(Olsen 2008)  See also:  (Closa 1992; Tindemans 1975; Commission 1988a)  
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citizenship and welfare, to move beyond such dimensions and embrace a more political 
conception of citizenship at the European level called into question the very nature of social 
identity, of society, and the role of the state. 
 
It appears that the Society Model conception was unable to ‘understand’ the idea of European 
citizenship in the context in which it was emerging because it challenged many of its central 
premises. The challenges that integration posed for the traditional state-centric conception of 
society were becoming increasingly apparent as the scope of the rights which mobile 
individuals enjoyed in the Community were developing. If these rights were to be understood 
as part of a ‘European citizenship’, the logical implication would appear to be that the EU 
must be a new form of political community with its own citizens.393 The assumptions on 
which the Society Model conception was based would therefore have to grapple with a 
number of difficult questions over the possibility that a new 'European Society,' was 
emerging, underpinned by a sense of collective identity that was independent from 
nationality, potentially underpinning and underpinned by values of cross-border solidarity 
and cohesion. Such questions would fundamentally challenge the assumptions on which the 
traditional relationship between the state, society and the individual were based. Must the 
state uphold and protect the cohesion of this European society in preference to the traditional 
state-centric values with which it had traditionally been concerned? Were the rights and 
obligations associated with citizenship to be derived solely from an individual's participation 
in the market and/or mobility? Was the overriding ‘collective interest’ in whose interests the 
state must act, now a collective European interest?  
The analysis shows that the discourse strand embodying the Market Model conception of the 
“Focus” dimension could much more easily make sense of European citizenship because it 
‘had’ no conception of society on which it depended. It could understand European 
citizenship as a parallel and additional form of citizenship without throwing into question its 
central assumptions. This discourse was therefore able to fashion a conception of citizenship 
                                            
393 While discourse in the founding years clearly expresses the belief that the EEC was a project of political 
integration, this had been very much linked with the treaty objective of peace. The impetus given by the Paris 
Summit, and the notion of ‘special rights’ (of political participation) advocated in the Tindemans report, indicate 
how the overall discourse was beginning to make links between the way in which the Community was 
developing, and the concrete implications for the relationship between the individual, the state and the 
Community. In this regard, the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament must also be 
considered.  
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that was based on individual market opportunity and the protection of individual rights. Any 
implications that Citizenship might have could largely be treated ‘separately’ from the 
majority of the discourse. This meant that, in ‘understanding’ and constructing the concept of 
European citizenship, there were fewer politically sensitive questions to be addressed. This is 
entirely consistent with the way that the post-2010 discourse has ‘appropriated’ much of the 
language linked with the Society Model conception as a new way to articulate the dominant 
Market Model conception of social justice.  
 
As has been referred to in the Overview Section, a ‘competing’ Society Model conception of 
the “Focus” dimension was present in the discourse until the late 1990s, predominantly 
confined to the context of social exclusion. However, it gave rise to a number of 
inconsistencies in the discourse as a whole. Policies directly addressing social exclusion state 
that “[social exclusion] is a structural phenomenon which…excludes part of the population 
from economic and social life” from “taking part in the social exchanges, from the 
component practices and rights of social integration and of identity.” and refers to “The multi-
dimensional nature of the mechanisms” of such exclusion. It indicates a belief that “It would 
be futile to combat social exclusion by tackling only one of its dimensions.”394 Yet, the 
dominant discourse reduces the action required to combat social exclusion to measures 
designed to promote employment.395  
 
This may indicate that, far from manifesting a competing conception of social justice, this 
discourse expressed a sensitivity on the part of the EU to the traditional way in which citizens 
and states understood this dimension of welfare and the issues raised for it in the EU context. 
This might explain its persistence in the context of social exclusion, where the politically 
sensitive issues relating to the nature of national welfare systems are most relevant. It must be 
contrasted with the way that the post-2010 discourse frames its conception of social exclusion 
and the “Focus” dimension in general. Rather than recognising and respecting a conflicting 
perspective on these issues, the post-2010 discourse instead presents the dominant discourse 
as if it is expressing the same perspective.   
 
                                            
394 (Commission 1992, 7–8) 
395 (Prodi 1999, 99)(Commission 2004, 15) 
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This feature of the post-2010 discourse, and the fact that the competing discourse becomes 
obsolete after the late 1990s, perhaps highlights one potential source of the dissatisfaction 
that some feel towards the EU today. It seems that the gap between the EU’s conception of 
social justice and that of citizens has widened. It seems the EU’s sensitivity to, and tolerance 
of, competing understandings is no longer considered in its formulation of policy.    
 
It also seems that the way in which European citizenship has been constructed in the 
discourse, and the form in which it was incorporated in the Treaty, has had an important 
influence on how the orientation of the EU has developed. Contrary to the view expressed in 
much of the literature, far from operating as a means through which to develop the ‘social 
dimension’ of the Community,396 attempts to develop the idea of European citizenship appear 
to have undermined the very rationality of an aspect of social justice which has proven 
crucial to how a number of important EU policy areas have been conceived: state aids, social 
protection, redistribution, social policy, services of general interest, and the issue of state 
regulation of the market more generally. There has been remarkable continuity from the late 
1990s in the way these policy areas have been conceived. 397  Instead of addressing the 
politically sensitive issues with which a Society Model conception would have to grapple, the 
Market Model conception appears to have attempted to side-step them, addressing them 
independently by means of a number of communication and information campaigns, and a 
separate discourse on democracy, rights and citizenship.398 There appears to be no link made 
between the concept of citizenship, and the way issues relating to the "Focus" dimension are 
conceived and implemented in policy.  
 
It seems clear that, in the present political climate, the deeper issues at the heart of the 
“Focus” dimension can no longer be avoided if the gap between the EU’s conception of 
social justice and that of its citizens is to be addressed. It seems that addressing legitimacy, 
                                            
396 This is a view expressed by a number of commentators, particularly when discussing the citizenship case law 
of the ECJ. See in particular” (Hatzopoulos 2005, 1605) In addition, with particular reference to the way the 
concept of Citizenship has been developed by the Court of Justice, there is a substantial body of literature that 
suggests that Citizenship has had the effect of leading to “The emergence of a fundamental freedom beyond 
market integration” which is seen to shift “the economic paradigm of European integration” (Wollenschläger 
2011) 
397 This is consistent with the individual rights based focus of much of the Court's case law. For more 
information on the orientation of the Court's case law, see: (Somek 2008, 220)  
 
398 For a few examples, see: (Commission 1988a; Commission 2001b; Commission 2005b; Commission 2010f)  
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and citizens' dissatisfaction, cannot be successful if ‘citizenship’ continues to be seen 
separately from the politically contentious policy areas identified above. Only if debates over 
citizenship begin to address questions concerning the nature of the market, and of society, 
and the respective role of the state and the EU in relation to them, will the gap between the 
EU’s conception of social justice and that of its citizens be addressed.  
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This paper does not suggest that the claims being made about the EU’s conception of social 
justice are objectively verifiable. Instead, this paper offers a series of observations so as to 
provide a particular perspective on the issues in question: viewed from within European 
policy discourse, it has sought to establish the EU’s perspective on what welfare requires, 
how its requirements should be met, who should be responsible for doing so and what the 
EU’s role should be - all issues very much at the heart of contemporary legal and political 
debate. In this paper, these issues are framed as issues relating to the meaning of ‘social 
justice.’  
 
It is important to stress that the research is not attempting to explain the policy discourse. It 
attempts to offer a critical understanding, by investigating the way in which the concept of 
social justice is invested with meaning – conceptualised - through the articulation of policy. It 
analyses how this conceptualisation influences the way that other concepts are conceived, and 
how it influences beliefs about how ideas should be framed if they are to make sense to others 
amongst the other concepts and discourses with which they co-exist.  
 
The paper has therefore taken a constructionist approach to the study of the EU.  It is based 
on the idea that shared systems of meaning exist, that they structure discourse and can 
therefore be the object of observation. It is just one of a number of research perspectives that 
could have been adopted. The value of this research depends on one’s willingness to 
acquiesce in the belief that technique of discourse analysis can make a contribution to the 
study and understanding of the EU.399  
 
                                            
399  This is a research approach that has been gaining support in the academic community for a number of years. 
See:(Dietz 1999)  
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The importance of this particular paper depends on the explanatory power of the two models. 
The paper has tried to identify the different dimensions across which perspectives on the 
questions under investigation might differ, drawing on the literature, tensions existing in 
contemporary political, legal and academic debate and different individual responses to them. 
It has then attempted to operationalize these insights in a conceptual framework that is, as a 
result, as robust and convincing as possible.  
 
The paper admits that a ‘full’ light is not being shed on the issues being explored because the 
research has confined itself to discourse produced by the Commission, just one of the 
institutions contributing to the policy-discourse in the EU; it has not covered ‘soft-law’ 
sources of discourse, such as the OMC, nor has it looked at the discourse produced by some 
of the smaller departments of the Commission. Moreover, while a substantial number of 
sources have been consulted, it has not been possible to cover all sources that may have 
proven relevant. However, this merely leaves scope for further investigation drawing on a 
different selection of materials. The validity and robustness of the research can be assessed 
by taking the research on the terms on which it has been premised. The justifications for, and 
limitations of adopting the approach taken have already been clearly outlined. It has been 
shown that there is no convincing reason that these limitations will prevent the research from 
making an important contribution to legal scholarship, and contemporary debates on the 
future of EU. 
CONTRIBUTION: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
This research identifies the broader assumptions lying behind the legal measures that have 
been taken throughout specific periods in the EU’s history. It can therefore assist in assessing 
the effectiveness of different EU legal instruments by giving substance to what specific 
measures were intended to achieve, why specific instruments were employed, and why they 
were conceived as they were. It provides the criteria against which to assess a measure’s 
‘success’ and opens the door to a more informed investigation into EU legal processes, and 
the effect of different measures on social outcomes.  
 
The research has also highlighted a number of contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
conceptions of social justice prevailing at various times. This offers an alternative perspective 
as to why certain policies may not have been successful in the past. Tensions at the 
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conceptual level may have led to a mismatch between the objectives pursued and the means 
chosen to achieve them. It is therefore important to revisit historic policies to re-assess the 
reasons for which they were seen to have ‘failed.’ It is necessary to make sure that potential 
paths of reform were not closed off, and look back at reforms that have been made to ensure 
they have been addressing the causes of the problems they were purporting to address. 
 
This paper has also shown that changing conceptions of social justice do not always 
correspond with changes in legislative and policy output. It opens the door to further study 
into the relationship between policy ideas, legislative output, and social impact.  
 
This paper can also make an important contribution to the increasingly popular 
constructionist approach to the study of European integration.400 It can contribute particularly 
well to the emergent field of integration studies that focuses on the role that discourse has 
played in European integration, by offering insight into the different understandings 
underpinning the decisions that have been taken over time. 
 
The research can contribute to the existing literature on European governance. It reveals the 
policy issues over which the nature of European governance is most contested. It indicates 
how the nature of the debate on European governance influences policy-outcomes, and 
therefore helps to identify the issues that need to be resolved to ‘tackle’ the problem of the 
EU’s legitimacy.401    
The research can also contribute to the literature on European citizenship. It has illustrated 
that questions over what European citizenship and European identity is, should be, or could 
become, are bound up with how the ‘“Focus” dimension of welfare is understood. The debate 
forms part of the frame through which the EU determines what policies are required and how 
they should be conceived, and the paper has highlighted the policy areas that are most 
influenced by the contours of this debate. Moreover, this paper suggests that European 
                                            
400 Social constructionist approaches to European integration traditionally look at the process of socialization 
within European Institutions. Discourse analysis is a subset of this tradition as it is based on the same premise 
that interest and identity are socially constructed.(Dietz 1999, 599)  For an overview of this literature, 
see:(Christiansen, Jorgensen, and Wiener 1999)  
401 For a small selection of literature pertinent to this area of EU law: (Weatherill 1995; Maduro 1998; Maduro 
1997; Joerges 1994; Joerges, Mény, and Weiler 2000; Bercusson et al. 1997) 
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citizenship should not be treated as a separate field of study and/or policy as the debate on 
European citizenship cannot be separated from the day-to-day work of the EU.402  
 
Finally, this paper raises an important issue over the relationship between overarching 
understandings, ideas and beliefs i.e ‘conceptions of social justice’ manifested in policy-
discourse, and various policy measures taken and social outcomes achieved. It therefore 
poses key questions over what practical steps can be taken to better orient social outcomes 
with citizens’ expectations, suggesting that there are limits to the legal means available for 
such purposes.  The changes brought about by, and the new language introduced in the Treaty 
of Lisbon appear merely to have altered the way that the discourse is articulated. The 
concepts it embodies appear to have been interpreted and reconstructed through the ‘frame’ 
of the Market Model conception of social justice and, despite there being a number of quite 
different possible understandings of such concepts, these changes have not prompted a re-
orientation in the way that the EU attempts to contribute to social justice today.  
CONTRIBUTION: CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF THE EU 
The EU’s powers, constitution and the legal, political and economic context in which it 
operates have changed significantly over time. It appears that many Europeans are not happy 
with all of these changes.403 This paper reveals that an additional fundamental change has 
taken place: the EU’s conception of social justice has changed profoundly since its inception. 
It is possible that the EU’s conception of social justice may no longer be in line with that of 
its citizens, and this may be part of the reason for the dissatisfaction some citizens feel today. 
This suggests that it might be necessary to widen the parameters of public debate, to ensure 
the EU’s conception of social justice is truly in line with that of its citizens.  
 
By identifying which dimensions of social justice have been most contested over time, this 
paper can help to indicate the issues over which such public debate could most fruitfully be 
stimulated. For example, it reveals that policies in relation to state aid, public services, and 
                                            
402 Some examples of the work on European citizenship and identity include: (Cederman 2001)(Delanty 1995; 
Delanty 1998; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Delanty 2000; Delanty 2002)(Eder 2001; Eder and Giesen 
2001)(Risse, Herrmann, and Brewer 2004)(Lehning.)(Shore and Black 1994)(Habermas 1990; Habermas and 
Cronin 1998) See also: (Schall 2012)(Bell 2002) 
403 (Bertoncini and Koenig 2014, 5) 
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redistribution are all related issues that emerge in the context of the historically contested 
“Focus” dimension of welfare, suggesting that debate over EU policy in these areas might 
need to make this relationship explicit. The paper also shows that the role of some policy 
areas, such as environmental and social policy, have changed quite significantly from the 
early years of the Community, to the present day. These may then be the priority policy areas 
over which to re-establish a public consensus. The research has also shown that the 
“European Social Model”, and “European values” now play an important role in the 
discourse, with many policy prescriptions being taken in their name. This implies that there is 
an urgent need to determine what these concepts actually mean to citizens today, to really 
assess if these policy measures are ‘necessary’ to preserve them.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper should be of interest not only to the academic community, but also to European 
citizens generally. For those who are ‘dissatisfied’ with the EU today, this paper can help 
them to establish the true source of their dissatisfaction, and help them to determine what 
should be done. For some, reforms to the EU’s legislative and governance mechanisms, or to 
the scope of some of its powers, will suffice. However, for others, more far-reaching change 
will be required. Some of the dissatisfaction observable today may result from the fact that 
the EU is attempting to create a type of society that many do not believe to be ‘socially just’.  
This is why wide public debate is vital. The future of the EU depends on establishing exactly 
why so many citizens are unhappy with the EU. For those convinced that it does, and should, 
have a future, the politically sensitive issues at the core of the concept of social justice must 
be addressed by means of real, open debate. Establishing public consensus on what social 
justice means in Europe today is the first step towards establishing if the EU has a future, and 
if so, what that future should be and how it can be helped to get there. This paper can help to 
make it possible for this step to be taken.  
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